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The Case for Preemptive Oligopoly Regulation
JEFFREY MANNS*
One of the few things former President Donald Trump and leading Democrats
appear to agree on is the need to subject Big Technology (“Big Tech”) firms to
antitrust scrutiny. But unsurprisingly they disagree about how to address the
problem. Senator Elizabeth Warren and many other leading Democrats have called
for breaking up large technology firms, such as Google, Amazon, and Facebook, in
a revival of the trust-busting progressive era of the early twentieth century. In
contrast, the Trump administration triggered more traditional antitrust monopoly
review of potential anticompetitive activities of a number of leading technology
firms, which is more likely to lead to financial sanctions (or more modest
consequences).
This Article argues that politicians may be identifying a legitimate concern about
the market power of actors in highly concentrated markets. But they are looking at
the problem through the wrong lens. The larger concern is less monopoly and more
oligopoly domination (and more the potential than the current impact of oligopolies
on the marketplace). The challenge of oligopolies is that it is difficult to monitor the
individual and collective exercise of market power by oligopolists. Existing oligopoly
regulation in the United States is almost exclusively reactive and fails to identify and
address the potential impact of market concentration with the notable exception of
the Federal Trade Commission’s and Department of Justice’s review of prospective
mergers. The Article makes the case for creating a mandate for federal regulators to
oversee oligopolies in a preemptive way in order to better identify the potential for
market abuses and to open up concentrated markets to greater competition. The
underlying logic is that even if regulators cannot pinpoint antitrust violations in the
present, the higher the degree of market concentration the greater the risk that
oligopolies will possess and exercise market power to entrench their power and
undercut competition. But rather than focusing on invasive divestments, this Article
suggests that policymakers consider employing a range of disclosure rules,
regulatory exemptions, and tax incentives to level the playing field for smaller
competitors in oligopolistic markets.
This Article focuses on the imperative for antitrust oversight of “filtering” or
“access oligopolies” who serve as gatekeepers against fraud, data aggregators, and
screeners of information and reputation. A small number of oligopolists dominate
internet searches, social networking, online shopping, and more traditional spheres
of accounting, rating agencies, and investment banking. Participants in these
concentrated markets can easily engage in conscious parallelism to mimic one
another’s prices and practices because of the homogenous nature of the goods or
services they provide. But the defining feature of many of these oligopolists is that
they have prioritized market share growth and entrenchment by focusing on
economies of scale, network benefits, and barriers to entry, rather than the
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conventional supracompetitive pricing that monopolists and oligopolists have
embraced in the past. In fact, the paradox of many of these filtering intermediaries
is that they may even enhance consumer welfare, such as by offering internet
searches or messaging for “free” to consumers, while at the same time leveraging
their market power to pressure corporate clients to adopt or retain their services.
Conventional antitrust regulation focuses on preventing monopolists’ abuse of
their market power to distort market pricing. In contrast, antitrust regulation of
oligopolies is almost exclusively reactive and limited in scope. Regulators prohibit
express collusion among oligopolies and impose limits on their expansion through
mergers and acquisitions based on the potential impact on market concentration. But
regulators lack the means to remedy the underlying entrenchment of oligopolies and
the resulting market distortions when there is no evidence of express communication
or circumstantial evidence of agreement among the parties.
This Article will suggest that antitrust regulators sustain preemptive periodic
oversight of highly concentrated markets (rather than react primarily in response to
merger reviews), impose heightened disclosures on oligopolists to facilitate
monitoring, and seek to open up these markets to greater competition by lowering
the regulatory, disclosure, and tax barriers to entry for small market participants.
This approach may not satisfy those echoing politicians’ calls for mandatory
divestments, but it is designed to recognize that high levels of market concentration
heighten the potential danger of collusion and leveraging of market power by
oligopolists.
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INTRODUCTION
We live in a world in which a small number of private actors serve as
intermediaries for information, networks, and accountability.1 The market power of
these oligopolistic entities has breathed new political life into antitrust regulation yet
also raised questions about whether the existing antitrust principles are relevant to
new challenges.2 We use Google or Yahoo to search for information. We network on
Facebook and LinkedIn. We talk on FaceTime, WhatsApp, GroupMe, or Skype. We
shop online on Amazon, Walmart, Target, and eBay. We count on other
intermediaries to police financial markets, which raise similar issues of how much
power can be entrusted in the hands of a small number of private actors without
distorting markets. We rely on the Big Four accounting firms to detect financial
fraud,3 the Big Three rating agencies to monitor financial risk,4 and a handful of
leading investment banks and elite law firms to oversee mergers and acquisitions and
initial public offerings.5
Similar themes cut across all of these types of intermediaries—a high degree of
filtering power is vested in a small number of intermediaries that serve as gatekeepers
against fraud, data aggregators, and screeners of information and reputation. The
importance of these intermediaries’ roles and the distorting potential of their market

1. The term oligopoly describes a setting in which a small number of firms dominate a
market, which raises distinctive regulatory challenges compared to a monopoly context (a
single seller in control of prices) and a competitive market situation (where there are numerous
sellers such that none can effectively influence supply or prices). See Jacob Weissman, Is
Oligopoly Illegal? A Jurisprudential Approach, 74 Q.J. ECON. 437, 457 (1960).
2. See Brent Kendall, Justice Department to Open Broad, New Antitrust Review of Big
Tech Companies, WALL ST. J., (July 23, 2019, 5:34 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/justice
-department-to-open-broad-new-antitrust-review-of-big-tech-companies-11563914235 [https
://perma.cc/W59Q-SGZ2] (discussing how the Department of Justice is opening up a broad
antitrust review of how large technology companies are potentially abusing their market
power).
3. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, OFF., GAO-08-163, AUDITS OF PUBLIC
COMPANIES: CONTINUED CONCENTRATION IN AUDIT MARKET FOR LARGE PUBLIC COMPANIES
DOES NOT CALL FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION 19, 75–76 (2008), https://www.gao.gov/assets/280
/270953.pdf [https://perma.cc/YP3U-E7WR].
4. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT ON NATIONALLY RECOGNIZED
STATISTICAL RATING ORGANIZATIONS, 9 fig.2 (2018), https://www.sec.gov/files/2018-annualreport-on-nrsros.pdf [https://perma.cc/UAF2-9LDR] (documenting that three rating agencies
dominate the market: S&P–49.2% market share; Moody’s–33.1% market share; Fitch–13.5%
market share; DBRS–2.3%; Other–1.9%); see also U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, ANNUAL
REPORT ON NATIONALLY RECOGNIZED STATISTICAL RATING ORGANIZATIONS 11 (2016), https:/
/www.sec.gov/ocr/reportspubs/annual-reports/2016-annual-report-on-nrsros.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/S7SU-YG4Z] (documenting that the top three rating agencies account for 96.5% of
the market, a higher percentage than before the Dodd-Frank Act was enacted, which initiated
greater regulation and oversight of the rating agency market).
5. MARKET SHARE REPORTER 369 (Robert S. Lazich ed., 13th ed., 2003) (reporting 2002
market shares of IPO lead underwriters as follows: Goldman Sachs–33.5%; Morgan Stanley–
23.1%; Credit Suisse First Boston–15.9%; Other–15.8%; Salomon Smith Barney–11.8%).
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power make these actors particularly appealing case studies for assessing the limits
and potential of oligopoly regulation.
The problem is that conventional antitrust regulation may not be able to provide
effective oversight of these oligopolistic actors. Currently, oligopoly oversight only
comes into play in cases of express collusion and review of mergers in concentrated
markets.6 This Article will argue that oligopolies should be subjected to greater

6. A broad literature has explored the challenges of regulating oligopolies since the
Sherman Act of 1890. The high-water mark for calls for regulators to address oligopolistic
markets was the 1968 Neal Report that sought for the Department of Justice to review
systematically oligopolistic markets and to impose mandatory divestments until no participant
had more than a twelve percent market share. See PHIL C. NEAL ET AL., REPORT OF THE WHITE
HOUSE TASK FORCE ON ANTITRUST POLICY, at 2, 115 Cong. Rec. S15933, S16036 (daily ed.
June 16, 1969). Unfortunately, oligopoly regulation was a path not taken. In recent decades
actions by the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice to oversee oligopolies
have receded to a mere trickle and been limited almost exclusively to the context of merger
reviews. In 2004, a Senior Economic Counsel to the DOJ went as far as stating that
“interdependence is normal and innocent in oligopoly,” that there is little reason to believe this
is a significant phenomenon, and that courts must “exclude testimony on structural conditions
[i.e., levels of market concentration].” See Gregory J. Werden, Economic Evidence on the
Existence of Collusion: Reconciling Antitrust Law with Oligopoly Theory, 71 ANTITRUST L.J.
719, 779, 788, 791 (2004). But the question of whether to regulate oligopolies has consistently
attracted fierce debate. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 125–26 (1978)
(arguing against oligopoly regulation based on skepticism of the ability of government
regulators to assess and remedy market efficiencies); CHARLES R. GEISST, MONOPOLIES IN
AMERICA 239–41 (2000) (discussing how Chicago School economist, George Stigler, led an
antitrust commission during the Nixon administration which denounced the Neal Report as a
misguided strategy for addressing market concentration, a conclusion which marked a shift
toward a much more restrained antitrust policy during the subsequent decades); Herbert
Hovenkamp & Carl Shapiro, Horizontal Mergers, Market Structure, and Burdens of Proof,
127 YALE L.J. 1996, 2005–06 (2018) (defending the lack of regulation of oligopolistic market
dominance in industries in which industry leader efficiencies or substantial economies of scale
can explain their sustained dominance); William E. Kovacic, Failed Expectations: The
Troubled Past and Uncertain Future of the Sherman Act as a Tool for Deconcentration,
74 IOWA L. REV. 1105, 1139–48 (1989) (discussing how antitrust regulators have largely
abandoned efforts at reducing the level of concentration of oligopolistic markets and
suggesting that while divestment strategies are plausible in theory they are difficult to
implement in practice); Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Regulating Oligopoly Conduct Under the
Antitrust Laws, 89 MINN. L. REV. 9, 14–15 (2004) (arguing that tacit collusion by oligopolies
should be actively regulated by courts based on whether participants in concentrated markets
have acted in ways consistent with their self-interest or in ways that facilitate tacit collusion,
such as by disclosing confidential pricing information, observing standard industry-wide terms
of sale, or following competitors' price increases during periods of overcapacity or declining
demand); RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 104–05 (2d ed. 2001) (concluding that the
Neal Report and other calls for regulation of oligopolies generally “assign[] far too much
weight to the single fact of concentration by ignoring all the other considerations”); Michael
Salinger, The Concentration-Margins Relationship Reconsidered, 1990 BROOKINGS PAPERS
ON ECON. ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS 287, 288–90 (arguing that the positive correlation
between higher market concentration and higher prices suggests that relaxed merger oversight
in oligopolistic markets is overlooking potential anti-competitive effects); Richard
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regulatory scrutiny and potentially proactive regulation. It will suggest that antitrust
regulators sustain preemptive periodic oversight of highly concentrated markets
(rather than react primarily in response to merger reviews), impose heightened
disclosures on oligopolists to facilitate monitoring both by public and private means,
and seek to open up these markets to greater competition by lowering the regulatory,
disclosure, and tax barriers to entry for small market participants.
Filtering intermediaries do not fit well into the current landscape of antitrust
oversight, which is focused on monopoly regulation rather than oversight of
oligopolies. Amazon may be the retail behemoth of the future, but it is far from a
retail monopolist of the present. Amazon accounts for approximately forty percent
of online sales, yet only five percent of overall retail sales.7 Goldman Sachs may
dominate the investment banking space, but, although its tentacles are extensive, it
is not a hegemon by itself and accounts for less than fifteen percent of mergers and
acquisitions advising.8 The problem is often not the market power of any individual
oligopolistic actor, but rather the aggregate power of actors in concentrated markets
to shape the terms of the marketplace in anticompetitive ways. The evidence of this
phenomenon is right before our eyes. For example, Amazon, Walmart, and Target
routinely match each other’s prices online within a remarkably short period of time.
The challenge is that conscious parallelism does not require explicit cooperation,
which would run afoul of antitrust laws.9 Instead, the access to near instantaneous
information online has made conscious parallelism function similarly to gas stations
on the same corner. The dominant market participants can simply observe and react
to each other’s pricing and practices and sidestep the scrutiny of antitrust law.
Economies of scale coupled with conscious parallelism have shielded oligopolies in
a range of industries from both meaningful competition and regulatory scrutiny.
In recent years, policymakers and pundits have bandied about the word
“monopoly” in calling for greater regulation of the technology industry. For example,
Senator Elizabeth Warren has called for the unwinding of many of the most high-

Schmalensee, Inter-Industry Studies of Structure and Performance, in 2 HANDBOOK OF
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 951, 987–88 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds.,
1989) (arguing for greater regulation of oligopolies based on the empirical evidence that
market “concentration is positively related to the level of price”). This Article is the first to
explore the potential for periodic oligopoly scrutiny to foster competition through disclosure
rule changes, regulatory exemptions, and tax incentives in an effort to balance the desirability
of greater competition in concentrated markets with respect for markets.
7. See Matt Day & Spencer Soper, Amazon U.S. Online Market Share Estimate Cut to
38% from 47%, BLOOMBERG NEWS (June 13, 2019, 1:34 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com
/news/articles/2019-06-13/emarketer-cuts-estimate-of-amazon-s-u-s-online-market-share
[https://perma.cc/7ZVB-EV49].
8. See Dealogic Investment Banking Scorecard, WALL ST. J. MONEYBEAT,
http://graphics.wsj.com/investment-banking-scorecard/ [https://perma.cc/PHV9-K8KP].
9. See, e.g., Franklin M. Fisher, Games Economists Play: A Noncooperative View, 20
RAND J. ECON. 113, 120 (1989) (discussing how competitors in concentrated markets
rationally try to maximize profits by engaging in tacit collusion); KEITH N. HYLTON,
ANTITRUST LAW: ECONOMIC THEORY & COMMON LAW EVOLUTION 73–75 (2003) (discussing
that conscious parallelism refers to companies in a concentrated industry conducting business
in strategically uniform ways based on the awareness that their competitors are pursuing
similar courses of action).
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profile mergers in the technology industry to undercut their monopoly power.10 Many
other Democratic leaders have echoed the need to roll back monopoly dominance of
significant sectors of the economy.11 President Trump’s administration followed suit
by initiating antitrust investigations of several leading technology companies for
potential market manipulation.12 The problem is that the issues both sides of the
debate hope to address concern more oligopolies than monopolies. Amazon, Google,
and Facebook are leaders in highly concentrated markets rather than monopolists.
Lasting solutions may require addressing ongoing efforts to address market
concentration and increase competition, rather than publicity grabbing, but more
challenging calls for divestments or break ups.
The federal government has embraced a soft approach to remedy oligopolistic
collusion by prohibiting price-fixing in which cartels function as if they are a single
monopolistic actor in setting prices. Prohibitions on price-fixing fail to address the
problems posed by filtering oligopolies. The small number of filtering
intermediaries, in any given field, means that these oligopolists can easily engage in
conscious parallelism to mimic one another’s prices without any explicit agreement.
But an equally important issue is the secondary effects that oligopolies may have in
distorting markets. Many filtering oligopolists can use their market power to stop
new or (small) existing entrants from posing a threat or to influence their clients. For
example, rating agencies use the threat of issuing unilateral ratings on companies
who do not use their services to make it more difficult for smaller rating agencies to
compete.13 Yelp and Google leverage their screening power in searches to pressure
companies to pay them for prominence in searches with the implicit threat of being
buried in results if they fail to do so and/or choose to work with alternative search
filtering providers.14
Another challenge is that oligopolies have in many cases lowered prices or
otherwise enhanced consumer welfare (at least in the short run), which is the exact

10. See, e.g., Astead W. Herndon, Elizabeth Warren Proposes Breaking Up Tech Giants
Like Amazon and Facebook, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03
/08/us/politics/elizabeth-warren-amazon.html [https://perma.cc/G5H2-2AC6].
11. See, e.g., Rani Molla & Emily Stewart, How 2020 Democrats Think About Breaking
Up Big Tech, VOX (Dec. 5, 2019, 4:10 PM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics
/2019/12/3/20965447/tech-2020-candidate-policies-break-up-big-tech [https://perma.cc/S6F2
-4RWM] (summarizing the leading Democratic presidential candidates’ positions on
expanding the use of divestments in antitrust enforcement).
12. See Brent Kendall, John D. McKinnon & Ryan Tracy, FTC Preparing Possible
Antitrust Suit Against Facebook, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 15, 2020, 7:17 PM), https://www.wsj.com
/articles/ftc-preparing-possible-antitrust-suit-against-facebook-11600211840 [https://perma
.cc/MMV5-TPEF]; David McLaughlin, Kurt Wagner & Naomi Nix, Trump DOJ Escalates
Big Tech Scrutiny with New Antitrust Probe, BLOOMBERG NEWS (July 23, 2019, 5:01 PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-07-23/u-s-opens-probe-of-online-platformsover-competition-harm [https://perma.cc/893X-SGQC].
13. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering of Public Markets: The Rating
Agency Paradox, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 16–17 (2002) (discussing the use of negative,
unsolicited ratings as a tool to attract the future business of debt issuers).
14. See, e.g., Frank Pasquale, Beyond Innovation and Competition: The Need for
Qualified Transparency in Internet Intermediaries, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 105, 112–19
(2010) (discussing the broad power that Google has to shape the contours of search results).
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opposite of the supracompetitive pricing that antitrust authorities have traditionally
policed as evidence of market power. For example, e-commerce titans such as
Amazon and Walmart appear to have consciously fostered short-term consumer
welfare benefits in reducing the cost of online purchases in order to grow their market
share and consolidate their market power.15 Similarly, social media providers offer
“free” services that enhance consumer welfare and use the wealth of information they
harvest from users of their services to make their information-based products for
marketing even more indispensable for corporate America.16 The ultimate concern is
about the effects of the inability of firms to compete with the scale and depth of the
dominant oligopolists’ market power. In the long run the entrenchment of
oligopolists will deter new entrants and arguably harm consumer welfare by limiting
choices and potentially leading to higher prices (and implicit costs) for consumers.
The problem is that the U.S. antitrust framework for oligopolies is purely reactive,
and therefore existing antitrust restrictions on oligopolies fail to prevent oligopoly
entrenchment and the resulting stifling of competition. Regulators prohibit express
collusion among oligopolies and impose limits on the expansion of oligopolies
through mergers and acquisitions based on the potential impact on market
concentration.17 At best, antitrust regulators can only indirectly affect oligopolists by
preventing acquisitions or mergers that will result in greater market concentration or
conditioning merger approvals on divestitures.18 But regulators lack the means to
remedy the underlying entrenchment of oligopolies and the resulting market
distortions when there is no express communication or agreement among the parties.
This Article will argue that oligopolies should be subjected to greater regulatory
scrutiny and potentially proactive regulation. It will suggest that antitrust regulators
sustain preemptive periodic oversight of highly concentrated markets (rather than
react primarily in response to merger reviews), impose heightened disclosures on
oligopolists to facilitate monitoring both by public and private actors, and seek to
open up these markets to greater competition by lowering the regulatory, disclosure,

15. See, e.g., Matthew Boyle, Walmart Subsidizing Some Vendors in Price War with
Amazon, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Oct. 14, 2019, 2:04 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news
/articles/2019-10-14/walmart-subsidizing-some-vendors-in-online-price-war-with-amazon
[https://perma.cc/KS92-5J26].
16. See, e.g., Cornelis Reiman, The Janus Face of Social Media, COST MGMT., Jan.-Feb.
2013, at 1, 2–3 (discussing the disconnect between the “free” cost of social media services to
consumers and the extensive data mining taking place based on their usage).
17. Because this Article seeks to address the shortcomings of oligopoly regulation, its
discussion focuses on the regulation of horizontal mergers under the Horizontal Merger
Guidelines. The Guidelines lay out the Federal Trade Commission’s and Department of
Justice’s framework for assessing and addressing the potential impact of mergers on market
concentration and competition. See U.S. DEP’T JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL
MERGER GUIDELINES (2010) [hereinafter Guidelines].
18. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago Antitrust: A Review and Critique, 2001
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 257, 334–35 (2001) (discussing the conventional application of the
Herfindahl-Hirschman market concentration index to review mergers in highly concentrated
markets); U.S. DEP’T JUST., ANTITRUST DIV., ANTITRUST DIVISION POLICY GUIDE TO MERGER
REMEDIES 6–12 (2011) (discussing the use of divestitures as “structural remedies” to “remedy
the competitive harm that otherwise would result from the merger”).
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and tax barriers to entry for small market participants.19 This approach may not
satisfy those echoing calls for mandatory divestments but is designed to recognize
that high levels of market concentration heighten the potential danger of collusion
and leveraging of market power by oligopolists. But in the absence of actual or
circumstantial evidence of collusion or evidence of abuse of market power, antitrust
regulators should instead preemptively monitor oligopolists and find ways to level
the playing field for smaller players and new entrants to increase competition.
Part I will provide an overview of the existing framework for the regulation of
oligopolies and the limits of existing proposals for reform and will describe the
particular problems posed by oligopolistic intermediaries. Part II will make the case
for preemptive regulation of oligopolies to open up opportunities for new entrants
and smaller entities.
I. THE EXISTING FRAMEWORK FOR OLIGOPOLY REGULATION AND POTENTIAL
REFORMS
A. The Incoherence of Existing Antitrust Restrictions on Oligopolies
For decades policymakers and courts have acknowledged the role of oligopolies
in distorting markets yet failed to address the problem of how to regulate and oversee
oligopolies. While the potentially distorting effects of oligopolies on prices and
market competition are clear, antitrust laws do not lay out any effective way to
identify tacit collusion or convergent behavior of market actors, let alone how to
address oligopolistic market dominance. That is why this Article is proposing a
framework for preemptive oversight and regulation of oligopolistic markets. Absent
direct evidence of collusion, plaintiffs and regulators are forced to prove collusion
using complex and often-shifting economic theories. The larger problem is that
antitrust law is largely toothless to address “conscious parallelism” in highly
concentrated markets if there is no evidence of an actual meeting of the minds among

19. Much of the literature that is critical of regulation of oligopolies (and monopolies) has
focused on the use of divestment as a policy tool, which is why this Article focuses primarily
on the potential for less invasive remedies to deconcentrate the market. See, e.g., KENNETH G.
ELZINGA & WILLIAM BREIT, THE ANTITRUST PENALTIES: A STUDY IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 47
(1976) (“[T]he consensus so far is that structural relief has been attempted in only a few cases,
and it has been performed rather badly in those.”); RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW—
AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 85 (1976) (“The picture that emerges of what antitrust divestiture
has meant in practice is not an edifying one . . . .”); LAWRENCE ANTHONY SULLIVAN,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 141 (1977) (“[I]t is not an easy thing to point to
significant remedial successes in [antitrust] proceedings”). But see William L. Baldwin, The
Feedback Effect of Business Conduct on Industry Structure, 12 J. L. & ECON. 123, 128–37
(1969) (finding that the imposition of conduct decrees in government monopolization suits
occasionally served to erode market positions of dominant firms); DON E. WALDMAN,
ANTITRUST ACTION AND MARKET STRUCTURE 155–65 (1978) (concluding that the antitrust
regulators’ efforts to seek divestitures in merger cases has caused dominant firms to adjust
behavior in ways that lowered entry barriers and increased competition in several concentrated
industries); SIMON N. WHITNEY, ANTITRUST POLICIES: AMERICAN EXPERIENCE IN TWENTY
INDUSTRIES 388–92 (1958) (concluding that dissolution actions have achieved valuable results
in some instances when used to restructure single-firm monopolies).
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oligopolists. Parties can mimic one another’s behavior in terms of price or quantity
or engage in other convergent market activity with virtual impunity absent evidence
of an agreement. Regulators have always had difficulty overseeing conscious
parallelism, and the advent of the internet has facilitated product transparency, which
has ironically made it easier for a range of industries to engage in convergent pricing
and practices. The primary recourse antitrust regulators have is to impose restrictions
on merger activity in oligopolistic markets, which can slow down further market
consolidation yet does nothing to address the existing dominance or organic growth
of oligopolies.
Since the passage of the Sherman Act in 1890, courts have been struggling with
delineating the scope of antitrust constraints for oligopolies. The Sherman Act
broadly outlaws “every contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade,”
which left courts and regulators to determine what degree of cooperation and
concentration rise to the level of antitrust violations.20 Initially, the Supreme Court
interpreted the Sherman Act’s prohibitions on constraints of trade in a sweeping way.
For example, United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n did not distinguish
between different types of restraints on trade.21 As a result, many common
(potentially benign) practices, like non-compete clauses made during the closing
period of the purchase of a company, were deemed to be illegal.
But the Supreme Court swiftly moved away from the Trans-Missouri line of
cases, in which any restriction on trade was deemed a violation of the Sherman Act.22
The Court recognized that any literal reading of the Sherman Act could chill
potentially productive forms of cooperation among industry participants, such as
intellectual property licensing, industry standardization, and other benign direct and
indirect interaction amongst competitors. In 1899, Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v.
United States23 was the first case to distinguish illegal naked restraints, in which
rivals agree to restrict production in order to raise prices above competitive levels,
from lawful “ancillary” restraints, in which parties have agreements on other
matters.24 But this decision left open-ended the degree of express and implicit
agreements that could take place when competitors are pursuing convergent
functions where standards can facilitate technological development—e.g, computer,
cell phone, and television makers. It left unresolved the extent to which seemingly
benign express or tacit agreements under the guise of standards or trade association
cooperation may impact the development of markets and the emergence of new
competitors by creating barriers to entry.25
The Supreme Court unpacked the logic of Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. in a line of
cases that sought to carve out rules and exceptions to determine the extent to which

20. See William E. Kovacic & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Policy: A Century of Economic and
Legal Thinking 2 (Univ. of Cal. Berkeley Ctr. for Competition Pol’y, Working Paper No.
CPC99-09, 1999).
21. See 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
22. Id.
23. 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
24. Kovacic & Shapiro, supra note 20, at 3.
25. The costs of market exit have been discussed to produce similar effects to those
created by higher barriers to entry. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, JOHN C. PANZAR & ROBERT
D. WILLIG, CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE (1982).
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explicit or implicit cooperation among competitors is permissible even if it may have
ancillary effects that reduce competition. The challenge was that the language of the
Sherman Act itself left little to no guidance as to the boundaries of legal and illegal
activities for oligopolists. In 1911, the Supreme Court established the “Rule of
Reason” as the basic method for interpreting the Sherman Act.26 Under the Rule of
Reason standard, judges would look at the conduct in question on a case-by-case
basis in order to judge the intent and actual harm. The courts identified some acts
that were deemed to be “per se illegal” under this standard that entailed express
collusion that centered around price-fixing. But most acts by firms, short of
collusion, were deemed legal even if they indirectly “restrained trade,” as long as
they were generally “benign” in nature. The question of what constitutes “benign”
restraints on trade was left open-ended and unresolved, which left the door open for
constructive cooperation, as well as for anticompetitive, oligopolistic collusion that
falls short of express price-fixing.
The Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914 provided a locus of enforcement of
antitrust law by vesting an independent agency with the role of making and
administering antitrust policy and the mandate of overseeing bans on “unfair
methods of competition” and “unfair or deceptive acts or practices.”27 The related
Clayton Act of 1914 gave the newly formed Federal Trade Commission limited
regulatory powers over oligopolies by prohibiting mergers and acquisitions when the
effect “may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.”28
Since that time, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Department of Justice
(DOJ) have acted in concert in working to review mergers for their potential
anticompetitive impact with each agency alternating control of the review process of
companies. Review of the impact of proposed mergers on competition has become
the primary focus of regulatory oversight of oligopolies in the absence of evidence
of express collusion over price-fixing. However, both Acts did little to address the
entrenchment of oligopolies outside of the merger context and largely left oligopoly
regulation to the courts to figure out how to address market concentration problems
and tacit collusion.29
Because of gaps in the legislative framework, courts gradually developed
contours for the antitrust regulation of oligopolists but did so in an incomplete way
that has left most oligopoly conduct outside the scope of federal oversight. For
example, in 1954, in Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp.,
the Supreme Court established that “conscious parallelism” (i.e., firms responding to
each other’s price or output changes independent of each other) is not in itself a
Sherman Act violation.30 The Second Circuit expanded on this view in E.I. du Pont
de Nemours & Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, noting that conscious parallel
pricing “represents a condition, not a ‘method’” and could indeed be consistent with

26. Id. at 4.
27. Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. § 45.
28. Clayton Act of 1914 § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (prohibiting certain types of tying
arrangements, exclusive dealing agreements, interlocking directorates, and mergers achieved
by purchasing stock).
29. Id. § 5.
30. 346 U.S. 537, 541 (1954).
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intense competition.31 However, the Supreme Court left the door open for potentially
prosecuting conscious parallelism if additional “plus factors” are in place that
indicate an actual conspiracy among the parties, yet left undefined what the contours
of these plus factors are.32
Academics have hypothesized what circumstantial evidence may, in the
aggregate, serve as evidence of an oligopolistic conspiracy,33 as well as economic
indicators that suggest collusion.34 Economic indicators of collusion include a
variety of market distorting behavior and barriers to entry including: (1) market
shares being fixed; (2) market-wide price discrimination; (3) firms sharing pricing
information; (4) prices within a market varying from region to region; (5) firms
regularly submitting identical bids; (6) price or output changes occurring at the
formation of the cartel; (7) industry-wide “resale price maintenance;” (8) market
shares of industry leaders showing decline; (9) markets where changes in price can
be easily checked; (10) a market where demand is inelastic at the market price; (11)
a market where profits can easily be tracked; (12) a market where the market price is
inversely correlated with the number of firms or elasticity of demand; (13) a market
where pricing is done using a system of “basing-point pricing;” and (14) a market
where exclusionary practices are common (including tying arrangements, predatory
pricing, vertical integration, exclusive dealing, and boycotts).
Nonetheless, courts have been reluctant to hold oligopolies accountable for
collusion in the absence of evidence of a smoking gun of an actual agreement.35 For
example, in Williamson Oil Co. v. Phillip Morris USA,36 the Eleventh Circuit
concluded that the government’s economic evidence of conscious parallelism merely

31. 729 F.2d 128, 139 (2d Cir. 1984).
32. Theatre Enters., Inc., 346 U.S. at 540–41 (“Circumstantial evidence of consciously
parallel behavior may have made heavy inroads into the traditional judicial attitude toward
conspiracy; but ‘conscious parallelism’ has not yet read conspiracy out of the Sherman Act
entirely.”).
33. POSNER, supra note 6, at 69–79. Posner posits that conditions that suggest
circumstantial evidence of collusion include: (1) the market being concentrated on the selling
side; (2) a lack of “small sellers;” (3) inelastic demand for the product at a competitive price;
(4) a market with a high cost of entry; (5) lack of concentration on the demand side of the
market; (6) a standardized product; (7) a non-durable product; (8) a market where the principal
firms in the market sell at the same level in the distribution chain; (9) a market where the only
competition is over price, as opposed to quality; (10) a market with a high ratio of fixed costs
to variable cost; (11) similar cost structures and/or production processes throughout the
market; (12) a market without growing demand; (13) a market where prices are not sticky;
(14) a market where sealed bidding is practiced regularly; (15) a local market; (16) a market
where cooperative practices already exist (where firms lobby together or are each other’s
customers as well as competitors, for example); and (17) markets where there is a history of
collusion.
34. Id. at 77–93.
35. See, e.g., In re Baby Food Antitrust Litig., 166 F.3d 112, 122, 124, 137 (3d Cir. 1999)
(affirming summary judgement in favor of the oligopoly after reviewing company documents
explicitly referring to “truce” in the industry and stating that finding otherwise would punish
“independent conduct of competitors” and “chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are
designed to protect”).
36. 346 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2003).
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indicated that an oligopoly existed, which in itself is not illegal.37 In the absence of
clear evidence of an agreement, mere circumstantial evidence based on the economic
structure of the market was deemed inadequate to establish an antitrust violation.38
Similarly, the First Circuit in White v. R.M. Packer Co.39 held that there was no
violation of antitrust laws when the evidence could not explain whether the parallel
pricing was achieved by agreement or mere interdependent actions. Other circuit
courts have given lip service to the role of economic factors in establishing
anticompetitive effects but have based their decision on concrete evidence. For
example, the Seventh Circuit in In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litigation40
laid out dicta (from Judge Posner) on the role of noneconomic factors in determining
that market participants in an oligopoly violated antitrust laws. But the Seventh
Circuit grounded its findings of antitrust violations primarily on a CEO’s statement
that “our competitors are our friends. Our customers are the enemy.”41 Similarly, the
Third Circuit in In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litigation42 noted the problems posed by
a high degree of market concentration but rested its decision of an antitrust violation
on evidence of collusion among oligopolists.43 In its approval of the merger between
T-Mobile and Sprint in 2020, two of the four leading players in the market, the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York also acknowledged the
impact on market concentration, which could increase the potential for conscious
parallelism, yet deemed the entrance of a new competitor, Dish Network, would
offset any negative impact on competition.44 The lack of uniformity in the circuit
courts’ analysis of “plus factors” reflects the lack of coherence and uniformity in the
Supreme Court’s oligopoly theory as a whole.
B. The Costs of Oligopoly Domination in the Intermediary Context
Part of the problem facing regulation of oligopolies is the nature of defining the
problem. Much of the debate on oligopolies has focused on how to identify and
whether to address tacit collusion which distorts industry pricing. For example,
Richard Posner has argued that oligopolistic supracompetitive pricing is frequently
the result of tacit collusion.45 Posner suggests that enforcement agencies should
target markets that appear susceptible to price manipulation and apply economic
analysis to determine if prices are higher than would be expected in a competitive
context, which would suggest express or tacit collusion.46 The challenge in applying
the Posnerian lens is the inherent uncertainty of determining whether a given

37. Matthew M. Bunda, Monsanto, Matsushita, and “Conscious Parallelism”: Towards
a Judicial Resolution of the “Oligopoly Problem,” 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 179, 202 (2006).
38. Id. at 201.
39. 635 F.3d 571 (1st Cir. 2011).
40. 295 F.3d 651 (7th Cir. 2002).
41. Id. at 662.
42. 385 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 2004).
43. Id. at 361–69.
44. New York v. Deutsche Telekom AG, 495 F. Supp. 3d 179 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).
45. POSNER, supra note 6, at 60, 69.
46. See id. at 69–70 & n.16–17.
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economic effect is a consequence of the oligopolistic structure of the industry or due
to other market forces, such as barriers to entry.
Other antitrust scholars have embraced the Donald Turner school of thought that
supracompetitive pricing is an unavoidable consequence of the structure of
oligopolistic markets and does not necessarily reflect tacit collusion.47 In other
words, concentrated markets naturally produce higher prices because of the reduced
level of competition, regardless of whether the concentration occurs through
successful competition or anticompetitive activity. This school of thought holds that
oligopolists should be effectively immune from antitrust scrutiny as long as there is
no “meeting of minds” among participants, which is consistent with courts’ handsoff approach to conscious parallelism by oligopolists so long as there is no overt
collusion.48 The primary shortcoming of both of these views is that oligopolistic
collusion on pricing is only part of the potential problem. Oligopolies can distort
markets in numerous ways and create barriers to entry that entrench a concentrated
set of market players.
The problem with oligopolies appears simple: companies can engage in tacit
mimicry to create and leverage market power. But this “conscious parallelism”
problem has proven to be remarkably difficult to police or remedy. In competitive
markets, firms lack market power. Firms are price takers, responding to market
demand and supply, and are generally not in a position to shape industry practices.
In contrast, a key feature of oligopolies is the awareness and exploitation of
interdependence among the small number of participants in concentrated markets.
Each firm recognizes that its decisions can significantly affect the market conditions
faced by its rivals.49 Under these circumstances, leading firms in an industry can,
through a series of individual decisions, settle on a price significantly higher than
what would be expected in a competitive market or converge on industry standards
that raise barriers to entry for competitors.50 Similarly, oligopolists can converge on
practices or even push for government regulations that create or reinforce barriers to
entry that entrench the dominance of the existing market actors. The end result is a
pattern of behavior that is economically equivalent to a traditional cartel, in spite of
the absence of an express agreement.51

47. See Donald F. Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act:
Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655, 666 (1962).
48. Id. at 664, 671.
49. See, e.g., George A. Hay, Oligopoly, Shared Monopoly, and Antitrust Law, 67
CORNELL L. REV. 439, 443–44 (1982) (contrasting individualism of competitive markets with
interdependence in oligopolistic markets). The awareness of interdependence has long been
recognized as the “most essential differentiating aspect” of oligopoly. K.W. Rothschild, Price
Theory and Oligopoly, 57 ECON. J. 299, 303 (1947).
50. There is a large body of literature devoted to modeling how oligopolistic firms can
engage in conscious parallelism without an express agreement. See, e.g., Guy Sagi, The
Oligopolistic Pricing Problem: A Suggested Price Freeze Remedy, 2008 COLUM. BUS. L. REV.
269, 272–86 (2008) (summarizing notable economic and game-theoretic models of
consciously parallel behavior).
51. See, e.g., Piraino, Jr., supra note 6, at 21–22 (noting the “consensus among
economists” that the effects of conscious parallelism are equivalent to those of express
anticompetitive agreements).
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The difficulty in policing conscious parallelism is that it is very difficult to stop
mimicry through conventional antitrust law. The classic example is gas stations on a
corner, all of which have remarkably convergent prices. No one can stop owners of
gas stations from looking across the street at each other’s prices. The gas station
owners sell a virtually identical product, and over time, owners can anticipate one
another’s moves in response to price changes to sustain higher prices for their corner
as they can come to act in concert as repeat players. A key difference between gas
station owners and conventional oligopolies is the degree of market power and the
size of the industry. Gas stations on a corner have to worry about gas stations down
the street and others that are miles away that serve as a credible alternative to
consumers. The larger the number of participants, the higher the risk of defection in
the absence of express, binding agreements. In contrast, in conventional oligopolies
the small number of participants in an entire industry makes it easier for conscious
parallelism to take place and for market participants collectively to sustain lasting
market power.
The larger problem is that the impact of oligopolists on the marketplace is not
limited to price effects. Participants in concentrated markets can create and sustain
durable barriers to entry that stifle competition. The same type of dynamics that may
facilitate mimicry of price may facilitate convergent practices that paradoxically
leverage transparency to raise the costs of entry. Ironically, regulation often
magnifies this type of problem by playing into the hands of dominant industry players
by creating layers of rules that smaller participants cannot cost-effectively comply
with. In fact, the power of oligopolists may give them a disproportionate role in
pushing for and shaping regulations in ways that reinforce their strengths and deepen
the barriers to smaller players and new entrants. The result is that oligopolists can
effectively entrench their dominance without being exposed to meaningful antitrust
scrutiny (outside of the merger review context).
C. The Filtering Intermediary Challenge
Filtering intermediaries serve as a useful case study for considering the limitations
of existing antitrust regulation and the merits and mechanisms of preemptive
oligopoly oversight. Intermediaries perform distinctive gatekeeping roles that
provide them with tremendous influence over users and the potential to perform
consumer-welfare enhancing functions. For example, financial intermediaries, such
as credit rating agencies, accounting firms, and underwriters, can serve as appealing
substitutes for public enforcement because of their ability to cost-effectively monitor
clients for unlawful or deceptive use of their goods or services. Online search engines
and online retailers allow consumers to streamline their searches and to engage in
comparisons of value, security, and speed that consumers could only achieve on their
own at a high cost.
The same dimensions of financial intermediaries that make them desirable as tools
for policing risks also facilitate tacit collusion, such as the small size of the industry,
relative homogeneity of their products, and the role of reputational capital in their

2021]

THE CASE FOR PREEMPTIVE OLIGOPOLY REGULATION

765

legitimacy.52 The small number of financial intermediaries in fields such as rating
agencies and accounting firms is both a boon and burden. Since financial
intermediaries function as reputational proxies, there may be a value in having a
finite number of actors performing this role. That way market participants can easily
verify reputational proxies about financial risk or financial accuracy without having
to invest time and resources in verifying the legitimacy of the gatekeeper source of
information. Think about how you approach internet searches in a similar way, as
there is reason to be skeptical about news or price information when it comes from
an unfamiliar source. That partly explains the market power that search engines such
as Google, Yahoo, or Firefox enjoy in serving as reliable filters for information. This
same phenomenon appears in a myriad of online contexts from internet searches to
the online transmission of money. For example, you do not need to spend much time
pondering why you would prefer to purchase an item from Amazon, Target, or
Walmart online, rather than “Portarget.com,” “Wufair.com,” or “Bonanza.com.” It
is not that there isn’t any competition online, as every search produces a myriad of
“no name” entities, but there is an absence of reputable alternatives in the same price
point range as the dominant three retailers. Similarly, this fact underscores the value
of an audit from a “Big Four” accounting firm for all market participants. These
leading accounting firms are so deeply entrenched that the failure to use one of the
“Big Four” may in itself be a “red flag” as was true in the Bernie Madoff ponzi
scheme.53 But the downside of the small number of leading firms is that it makes it
easier for financial gatekeepers to coordinate behavior. Just as the law of large
numbers ensures a higher risk of defection, the smaller the number of oligopolists
the easier it is for parties to monitor and mimic one another for mutual benefit.
Another feature of financial intermediaries, which is both a vice and virtue, is that
they produce relatively homogenous products. For example, the methodologies of
rating agencies vary, but their assessments of credit risk are remarkably similar in
practice, both in terms of substantive analysis and conclusions.54 Having little
product differentiation makes it easier to compare ratings from one rating agency to
another, but it also facilitates mimicry. This fact can frustrate the very purpose of
gatekeepers in detecting fraud or excessive risk taking as they can all converge on
remarkably similar processes and outcomes, whether or not their approaches actually
heighten accuracy or serve to entrench their clients and themselves. This same
phenomenon appears in internet searches, as while the search algorithms are
different, there is significant fungibility in the results particularly when it comes to
important segments of the market such as online commerce or customer rating
searches.

52. See Hay, supra note 49, at 447–51 (discussing characteristics that facilitate oligopoly
pricing).
53. Matthew Goldstein, Madoff Accountant Avoids Prison Term, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK
(May 28, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/29/business/dealbook/madoff-accountant
-avoids-prison-term.html [https://perma.cc/XF8U-RBCL] (discussing the failures of micro
accounting firm Friehling & Horowitz—which consisted of one accountant—to oversee
Bernie Madoff’s fraudulent financial empire).
54. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Ratings Reform: The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly, 1
HARV. BUS. L. REV. 231, 245–46 (2011) (discussing how ratings from the leading rating
agencies frequently converge).
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The related problem is the interconnected roles of government regulation, selfregulation, and reputational capital in entrenching financial gatekeepers.
Government regulation, deference to industry self-regulation, and other forms of
recognition of financial intermediaries may effectively laurel oligopolistic actors
with reputational capital by granting the imprimatur of the state. For example, wellintended regulation to certify that financial intermediaries meet government
standards may function as barriers in practice and reinforce the oligopolistic nature
of the industry. To the extent that the federal government defers to private parties to
fulfill public gatekeeping purposes, it is understandable that the government would
want to make sure qualified parties are serving this role. The challenge is that
government regulation may create protectionist barriers that shield established
players from competition. For example, qualifications for certification as a nationally
recognized statistical rating organization emphasize the rating agency’s track record,
which is hard and expensive for new entrants to replicate.55 Similarly, well-intended
requirements that no client of a rating agency amounts to more than ten percent of
their business (to mitigate potential conflicts of interest) have hamstrung the ability
of small rating agencies to compete with the top three market participants.56
Government regulation is less of a concern in exacerbating market concentration
in the online world. Facebook and LinkedIn are dominant players in social and
professional networking, not because of the high cost of government regulatory
restrictions but because of the network benefits that arise from their hundreds of
millions of users. Amazon has used its economic power to shake down states and
localities for subsidies, as its search for a second headquarters underscored, but the
success of Amazon’s core business is primarily based on economies of scale and
strategic investments in its distribution networks rather than government regulation.
Ironically, Amazon championed the imposition of an online sales tax, but not because
of any sympathy for its brick-and-mortar competitors. Instead, Amazon sought to
strip advantages away from its smaller online competition as Amazon built a broad
network of distribution centers throughout the country that would expose it to state
taxes because of its physical footprint.57
Similar problems arise from government deference to self-regulation. Selfregulation or self-regulatory organization rules may rise (or descend) from the level
of standard setting to constituting protectionist barriers that shield established players
from competition. For example, the creation of Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles and formalization of accounting practices creates a lingua franca and clear

55. See Frank Partnoy, How and Why Credit Ratings Agencies Are Not Like Other
Gatekeepers, in FINANCIAL GATEKEEPERS: CAN THEY PROTECT INVESTORS? 59, 60–62
(Yasuyuki Fuchita & Robert E. Litan eds., 2006) (discussing how the rating agency industry
has an “oligopoly market structure that is reinforced by regulations that depend exclusively on
credit ratings issued by Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations”).
56. See Peter Feltman, SEC Grants Bond Rater Exemption for Large Clients, CONG. Q.
ROLL CALL (Oct. 14, 2015) (discussing the SEC’s granting an exemption to the Kroll Bond
Rating Agency to allow it to temporarily violate the 10% cap on revenues from any single
client).
57. See Jacob Goldstein, Why Amazon Supports an Online Sales-Tax Bill, NPR: PLANET
MONEY (Apr. 22, 2013, 12:57 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/money/2013/04/22
/178407898/why-amazon-supports-an-online-sales-tax-bill [https://perma.cc/84PF-SAY6].
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expectations for the accounting world which creates broad benefits. But this progress
also comes at a potential price as relatively homogenous products facilitate
convergence in pricing and process and make it easier for parties to curb defection
from the oligopoly. Similarly, measures from online retailers to curb counterfeit
product selling by participants on their sites reinforces the private regulatory role of
Amazon, Walmart, or eBay over their respective website marketplace participants.58
Even to the extent that governments roll back regulatory barriers on new entrants
or smaller players, the centrality of reputational capital to filtering intermediaries
also poses significant barriers to entry. Reputational capital is difficult to build, so
prospective entrants must weigh the financial and temporal challenges and
uncertainties of attracting business and building up their reputations enough to viably
compete with established players. The related problem is that reputation is sticky.59
Entrenched intermediaries can cash in their reputation by imposing higher prices or
laxer gatekeeping without the fear of immediate reputational costs to their
businesses. That is what happened to the run up to the financial crisis, as financial
intermediaries traded off greater profits for greater risks to their reputations by
legitimizing dubious collateralized debt obligations. Amazon and eBay have recently
claimed to crack down on counterfeit products. But historically they have profited
from lax gatekeeping by allowing large-scale sales of counterfeit products,60 just as
social networking sites, such as Facebook and Twitter, have profited from legions of
fake profiles that warp the scale of their clout for prospective advertisers.61 While
financial intermediaries faced the fallout from legislators and regulators for lax
gatekeeping after the financial crisis, their reputations emerged largely unscathed
because there was more than enough blame to go around to other market parties as
well as the government. Online oligopolists have fared even better by leveraging
their influence in the economy and in the world of public opinion to quell any
meaningful effort to check their market power.62
Conventional oligopoly analysis focuses on the potential for actors to maintain
supracompetitive pricing (i.e., prices above what one would expect in competitive

58. See Emily Birnbaum, US Announces Crackdown on Counterfeit Products Sold
Online, THE HILL (Jan. 24, 2020), https://thehill.com/policy/technology/479852-us-announces
-crackdown-on-counterfeits-online [https://perma.cc/3BF9-AAWC] (discussing efforts by the
United States and retailers, Amazon and eBay, to crack down on counterfeit good trafficking).
59. Jeffrey Manns, Insuring Against a Derivative Disaster: The Case for Decentralized
Risk Management, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1575, 1585 (2013) (discussing how “market actors often
give much greater weight to past reputation than to more recent shortcomings in
gatekeeping”).
60. Malathi Nayak, Lawmakers Spur Amazon, eBay to Crack Down on Counterfeits (1),
BLOOMBERG LAW (June 4, 2019, 6:10 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/ip-law/amazonebay-confront-counterfeit-scourge-in-hill-meeting [https://perma.cc/X7KF-RK2C].
61. See, e.g., Elaine Moore & Hannah Murphy, Facebook’s Massive Fake Numbers
Problem, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2019, 3:38 PM), https://www.latimes.com/business
/technology/story/2019-11-18/facebooks-massive-fake-numbers-problem [https://perma.cc
/6LNW-GJ5W].
62. See, e.g., Cecilia Kang, Tech Industry Pursues a Federal Privacy Law, On Its Own
Terms, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/26/technology/techindustry-federal-privacy-law.html [https://perma.cc/RC3T-63CM].
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markets).63 While that is a concern with filtering intermediaries, oligopolistic firms
may also collude—tacitly or expressly—on a range of competitive factors aside from
price.64 The underlying logic of conscious parallelism works the same way as it does
in the pricing scenario; interdependence enables the emergence of cooperative
strategies that boost oligopolists’ profits at the expense of issuers/investors/overall
financial system.
For example, one of the key aspects of filtering intermediaries is that they perform
screening functions to filter information, detect fraud, and/or excessive risk taking.
Inasmuch as filtering intermediaries mimic each other’s standards or conduct due to
conscious parallelism, this convergence may come at the expense of performing their
core functions. Lax gatekeeping is a problem that negatively impacts financial
markets as a whole but may serve at least the short-term interest of the financial
actors that gatekeepers serve. The concentrated nature of the market may allow firms
to follow each other’s lead in pursuing profit at the expense of quality. Theoretically,
in competitive markets, reputational constraints would punish gatekeepers who
appear to compromise on quality, similarly to how price competition punishes firms
who set excessive prices.65 Under this logic, individual gatekeepers should be
deterred from seeking profits via practices that negatively impact the perceived
quality of their services; the prospect of additional profits is offset by the prospect of
losing market share to “cleaner” rivals. Under oligopoly conditions, however, the
major firms can blunt the force of reputational constraints by pursuing qualitycompromising practices in unison. Put simply, if everyone’s a little bit dirty, no one
can be singled out for it. This problem is magnified by the stickiness of reputation,
as reputation takes a long while to cultivate and equally long periods of time to erode
in the public’s eye.
The accounting and rating agency contexts both underscore this danger.
Accounting firms paved the way for the Enron accounting scandal (and similar
scandals at other companies) through their aggressive marketing of non-audit
services to audit clients. This arrangement allowed accounting firms to expand their
profits but at the cost of potentially compromising auditors’ independence, thereby
weakening a key safeguard of audit integrity.66 Economic theory would suggest that

63. Some commentators frame this behavior as “tacit collusion.” The terms are
interchangeable in their meaning, different connotations aside. See HYLTON, supra note 9, at
73 (defining conscious parallelism as a process by which oligopolists seek to “maintain a high
price or to avoid vigorous price competition”); POSNER, supra note 6, at 52–53.
64. Alexis Jacquemin & Margaret E. Slade, Cartels, Collusion, and Horizontal Merger,
in 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 415, 420 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D.
Willig eds., 1989) (“Firms [engaging in collusion] can choose from a rich set of non-price
instruments of rivalry, such as advertising, product quality, productive capacity, and R&D . .
. .”) (emphasis added).
65. The role of reputation as a guarantor of high quality has been studied extensively. See
Joseph E. Stiglitz, Imperfect Information in the Product Market, in 1 HANDBOOK OF
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 769, 823 n.59 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds.,
1989) (highlighting notable examples from a “vast literature” on the economics of reputation).
66. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: “It's About the Gatekeepers, Stupid,”
57 BUS. LAW. 1403, 1411–12 (2002); Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the
Management and Control of the Modern Business Corporation: Some Initial Reflections, 69
U. CHI. L. REV. 1233, 1237–38 (2002).
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in competitive markets one or more major firms would have refused to go along with
this trend, choosing instead to emphasize their commitment to high-quality audits in
an attempt to take market share from the others by strengthening their reputation.
However, a tight oligopoly in the market for large audits allowed all of the then “Big
Five” auditing firms, acting in conscious parallelism with one another, to become
increasingly management-friendly while expanding their consulting operations—
thus allowing each of them to profit hugely from consulting fees without the danger
of losing market share due to reputational damage.67 While this particular problem
was addressed in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act through a prohibition on accounting firms’
cross-marketing of consulting services, it underscores the type of process
convergence that can arise in oligopolistic markets.68
Similarly, conscious parallelism among rating agencies in the run up to the
financial crisis raised a similar cautionary tale. In the mid-2000s, Moody’s, S&P, and
Fitch were heavily engaged in the rating of subprime mortgage debt instruments.
Despite the fact that this market accounted for a significant portion of the agencies’
revenue, and that the instruments in question were both novel and complex, the
agencies all converged on ratings inflation as the quality of the underlying collateral
decreased while ratings remained high.69 Again, in normal conditions of market
competition, economic theory suggests that at least some firms would have exercised
greater caution, investing more heavily in diligence, especially given the size of the
subprime debt market. In turn, firms who adopted the lax approach of the “Big
Three” would stand to lose significant market share once the extent of their
negligence became apparent. But conscious parallelism allowed each of the leading
rating agencies to mitigate scrutiny up front and to minimize accountability on the
back end after the extent of their laxness was exposed.
Another issue is that the oligopolistic structure of financial gatekeepers may
reduce the amount of information produced by financial gatekeepers as a whole and
suppress innovation.70 Oligopolistic mimicry suppresses innovation as gatekeepers
may have little incentive to differentiate their products if they can sustain a high
degree of profitability through convergent practices. In contrast, greater competition
means that firms may have more to gain from greater product or process

67. See, e.g., James D. Cox, The Oligopolistic Gatekeeper: The U.S. Accounting
Profession, in AFTER ENRON: IMPROVING CORPORATE LAW AND MODERNISING SECURITIES
REGULATION IN EUROPE AND THE U.S. 269, 289–92 (John Armour & Joseph A. McCahery eds.,
2006) (suggesting that the small number of dominant accounting firms post-Enron allowed the
remaining big firms to retain overall market share despite having relaxed their standards over
the previous several years); Coffee, Jr., supra note 66, at 1414–15 (alleging that relaxation of
standards by the then “Big Five” accounting firms in the late 1990s was a result of “implicit
collusion”).
68. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 201, 116 Stat. 745, 771
(2002) (codified in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and 28 U.S.C.).
69. See Jeffrey Manns, Rating Risk After the Subprime Mortgage Crisis: A User Fee
Approach for Rating Agency Accountability, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1011, 1046–47 (2009).
70. More ratings activity generates more information overall due to particular features of
the rating industry. Multiple agencies independently rate the same clients, and the judgments
of ratings agencies are completely encapsulated in simple grading scales, whose granularity
facilitates comparison.
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differentiation. In the case of rating agencies, a higher level of competition would
provide incentives for greater variation in terms of risk models to differentiate firms
in terms of accuracy, which could heighten the probability that at least one rating
agency anticipates emerging risks. A benefit of this approach is that it would make
more information available to the public because rating agencies would likely look
at more factors and assess them from additional angles. A lower degree of market
consensus would potentially spur other financial actors to scrutinize ratings and
financial risks more thoroughly. Similarly, the convergence of pricing, delivery, and
promotional practices by e-commerce firms means that not only do customers face
remarkably convergent pricing from the leading e-commerce companies but
increasingly also face similar terms at every step in the transaction, which ends up
giving consumers less options and less variability in terms of prices.
D. The Need for Regulatory Solutions That Promote Both Competition and
Accountability
The nature of oligopolistic entrenchment poses challenges for policymakers in
seeking to craft solutions that both facilitate greater competition and foster
accountability in oligopolistic markets. The concern is that government intervention
may have distorting effects that impair competition. For example, the costs of
regulatory compliance often perversely reward scale and size (and the rules
themselves are often molded or adjusted over time by the largest industry players
who have greater lobbying pockets and sway). A related, yet distinctive concern, is
that regulations may be toothless if safe harbor conditions or other formalist legal
requirements insulate parties from oversight and accountability. Understanding each
of these challenges is key to considering the potential solutions to oligopolistic
dominance that regulators should consider.
One of the greatest challenges to addressing oligopolistic dominance is
overcoming barriers to entry which have economic, reputational, and regulatory
dimensions. Market entry in a general sense often appears to be simple. Incorporating
a company costs a nominal amount of money, and each year over six hundred
thousand new businesses are formed in the United States.71 In theory, start-ups have
some comparative advantages as they avoid legacy-cost burdens such as pension
fund costs, higher labor costs due to unionization, and the absence of outdated
infrastructure. Sometimes start-ups are able to sidestep existing competitors by
utilizing new technologies and redefining the markets through creative disruption—
think of how Amazon and eBay utilized emerging online markets to outflank existing
brick and mortar retail competitors to forge dominant positions in online retail of
new and used goods respectively. Sometimes start-ups are able to create whole new
categories of activity,72 such as the social and professional networking facilitated by
Facebook and LinkedIn, which provides them with a first mover advantage. The

71. See HENRY R. NOTHHAFT & DAVID KLINE, GREAT AGAIN: REVITALIZING AMERICA’S
ENTREPRENEURIAL LEADERSHIP 43 (2011) (discussing how six hundred thousand new
businesses are created on average each year, but that seventy-seven percent of these businesses
will fail within a year).
72. See, e.g., Joseph Farrell, Moral Hazard as an Entry Barrier, 17 RAND J. ECON. 440,
444–45 (1986).

2021]

THE CASE FOR PREEMPTIVE OLIGOPOLY REGULATION

771

credit ratings industry provides another notable example, in which the three dominant
firms—Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s, and Fitch—also happen to be the first three
large-scale firms to enter the market for credit ratings (opinions on
creditworthiness).73As the earliest firms to achieve a high degree of economies of
scale in issuing ratings, they did not face the same initial costs that new potential
competitors would currently face and did not have to overcome the reputational
strengths of entrenched incumbents. Instead, they were forging new types of
reputational goods and could use their marketing and branding both to build and
entrench the emerging markets for their products.
But once firms have established their dominance, new entrants often face
formidable barriers to break into the inner circle of oligopolists who may have a wide
spectrum of market power-related tools to marginalize competitors. One of the most
significant barriers is the nature of reputational dynamics, which make it much more
difficult for new entrants to compete with established oligopolists.74 A simple
thought exercise can help to explain the challenge of overcoming reputational
barriers. Think of the last time you purchased something online. It may be that you
sought to purchase a narrow niche product that for whatever reason may not be on a
general marketplace website like Amazon or Walmart.com. But those purchases are
increasingly the exception to the rule because Amazon (and to a lesser extent
Walmart) are as much forums for commerce as the direct suppliers. If you search for
any given product on Google (another oligopolist of note), you will get search results
that feature convergent pricing on a handful of websites such as eBay, Walmart.com,
Target.com, and Amazon. You will also see the product offered by smaller retail
websites that you have likely never heard of (and whose names often change, which
in itself should raise eyebrows) and who seek to match the terms of the oligopolist
online retailers. If you are like most consumers, you will end up purchasing the item
on Amazon or Walmart.com simply because, all other things being equal, you will
trust in the reputation for quality, efficient delivery, certainty of return eligibility, and
safeguards against online fraud offered by the dominant online retailers.
Because of the economies of scale that the online retail behemoths enjoy, the
reality you do not observe is that even the efforts of the smaller retailers to match or
marginally beat Amazon’s prices may come at the cost of narrow margins or
sustained losses merely to attempt to build market share. The long-term hope of
smaller competitors is that they can grow quickly enough and secure capital quickly
enough to scale up even as their larger rivals achieve ever greater economies of scale.
This insight suggests that would-be entrants must spend heavily (through accruing
losses) on activities in an attempt to build up their reputations, which may not be
economically sustainable. The larger concern is that potentially the advantages
dominant firms enjoy may be insurmountable at least for the foreseeable future
because their economies of scale effectively thwart existing or would-be competitors.
As this Article will discuss later, these daunting barriers to entry provide

73. See, e.g., Norbert J. Gaillard & Michael Waibel, The Icarus Syndrome: How Credit
Rating Agencies Lost Their Quasi-Immunity, 71 SMU L. REV. 1077, 1081–82 (2018)
(discussing the rise of Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s, and Fitch as the leading players in the
rating agency industry).
74. The term “entrant” describes any firm, from a new startup to an established niche
operator, that seeks to compete with the industry’s dominant firms.
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justifications for treating smaller competitors like small businesses with regulatory,
disclosure, and tax preferences to level the playing field.
Start-ups face a chicken and egg problem for establishing reputations in the face
of entrenched competitors. Reputations are a strategy for reducing uncertainty when
the quality of services cannot be ascertained at the time of purchase.75 They are
shaped partially, but not exclusively, by a firm’s past performance.76 From the point
of view of the consumer and the market as a whole, entrants have no reputation, or,
equivalently, they have a reputation of unknown quality which consumers would
systematically discount. This is a major disadvantage for upstart firms, to the extent
that reputation is the true underlying “product” that companies purchase from
gatekeepers and online intermediaries.77 Under these circumstances, an entrant
would have incentives to offer discounts to entice new customers to attract attention
and build market share. However, this straightforward strategy is complicated by the
relationship between price and reputation—an entrant’s discounted price sends an
ambiguous signal: the entrant could be either a high-quality firm seeking to build its
reputation or a low-quality firm that can afford to offer less because it spends less on
diligence or quality control.78 Therefore, in order to effectively signal its commitment
to high quality, the entrant must cut its price even further, to a level where even a
low-quality firm would be expected to have zero or negative profit (which would
entail burning its venture capital in the hope of building market share).79
A related problem is that there is not necessarily a linear way to build reputation.
We may think of reputational ratings through the prism of eBay or Uber ratings. Each
time a purchase takes place, both the consumer and supplier have the chance to rate
one another. In theory, this interaction creates credibility for the reputational ratings.
But there is widespread evidence that these ratings are less revealing about reputation
than they purport to be because of intermediaries’ exclusion of negative results (often
paid for by the sellers as in the case of Yelp) or intermediaries’ tolerance of paid
plaudits.80

75. This condition is widespread in financial gatekeeper industries. In many cases,
mistakes or shortcuts—or worse, deliberate fraud—cannot be detected until long afterward.
See Stephen Choi, Market Lessons for Gatekeepers, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 916, 939–943 (1998)
(discussing challenges that gatekeeper industries face due to difficulty of verifying accuracy
and fidelity of individual gatekeepers and outlining potential responses, including increased
reliance on reputation).
76. See, e.g., Stiglitz, supra note 65, at 829–31 (developing a model of how information
on a firm’s past performance is used to create rational expectations concerning future
performance).
77. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market
Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 613–21 (1984) (“In essence, the investment banker rents the
issuer its reputation.”).
78. See Stiglitz, supra note 65, at 825 (noting that discount pricing may fail to bring new
customers due to suspicion that low prices result from low quality).
79. See Farrell, supra note 72, at 441, 448 (discussing how entrants may be able to signal
high quality by demonstrating a “pure sacrifice” of profits in an introductory period).
80. See, e.g., Yonathan A. Arbel, Reputation Failure: The Limits of Market Discipline in
Consumer Markets, 54 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1239, 1245–54 (2019) (discussing the range of
potential pathologies that distort the value of consumer reviews).
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The broader problem is that the reputation of entrenched parties may be
unassailable. For example, think of the credit card context. If a retailer refuses to
accept Amex, Visa, Mastercard, or Discover, consumers may interpret that as a
negative signal. If a lesser-known credit card is able to persuade retailers (by cutting
their percentage fees charged to retailers) to accept their card, that change would do
little to change consumers’ perceptions of the “big four” credit card companies
compared to new entrants. Even offering consumers a substantial amount of cash
back on their purchases would make it difficult to erode oligopolists’ dominance as
the experience of smaller credit card companies in trying to build market share has
underscored.
A related challenge is that the market may punish (or at least, many managers
believe it will punish) those companies who do not choose (visible) intermediaries
with well-established reputations. In contrast, the reputation of suppliers may matter
far less if their brand is not publicly accessible—the notable exception being when
supply scandals arise such as in the quality of food in a firm’s supply chain or
defective inputs used in the production of some other product. For example,
consumers may be less likely to use a retail website if it does not accept one of the
big four credit cards but only allows parties to pay through electronic checks from
consumers’ banks (in order to avoid or minimize any processing fees). To the extent
managers believe that they will face reputational fallout from not relying on the
established players, they have a strong incentive to stick with the oligopolists, instead
of going with a lower-priced newcomer.81 After all, it defeats the purpose of saving
on fees if in turn the company’s cost of borrowing increases, or its stock value
decreases because of reputational backlashes or reduced revenues from consumer
reactions.
One of the key features of filtering intermediaries is that they can potentially
leverage their brands both to build consumer loyalty and to pressure actors to rely on
their services. For example, Google and other search engines can use features such
as options for firms to pay for greater prominence in search results to incentivize
companies to use their services. Similarly, Yelp can use its rating system to pressure
companies to advertise Yelp at their establishments and/or pay to decrease the
prominence of negative feedback from their customers in their ratings. Another
example is that the dominant three credit rating agencies can leverage their
reputations to pressure companies into retaining their services. For example, both
Moody’s and S&P have issued unsolicited ratings when issuers have chosen not to
pay for their services.82 Because the issuers were not clients in these cases, the rating
agencies had less information on which to base their ratings decisions and therefore
could justify lower ratings on the premise that they had to assume unknown

81. Cf. U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., GAO-03-864, PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRMS: MANDATED
STUDY ON CONSOLIDATION AND COMPETITION 45–52 (2003) (presenting results of a Fortune
1000 survey in which eighty-eight percent of respondents said they would refuse to consider
an accounting firm outside of the “Big 4”).
82. See, e.g., Frank Partnoy, How and Why Credit Rating Agencies Are Not Like Other
Gatekeepers, in FINANCIAL GATEKEEPERS: CAN THEY PROTECT INVESTORS? 59, 70–73
(Yasuyuki Fuchita & Robert E. Litan eds., 2006) (discussing instances in which ratings
agencies allegedly used unsolicited negative ratings to coerce rated entities to purchase full
ratings).
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information in a conservatively negative way. It is true that not every type of
intermediary may be able to leverage these types of unilateral pressure on prospective
clients (e.g., accounting firms who provide services only for paying clients). But this
potential exploitation of reputational power offers another reason why intermediaries
possess extraordinary means to entrench their dominance.
As discussed earlier, antitrust law currently lacks the tools to lower the barriers to
entry for new entrants in oligopolistic markets. Antitrust law primarily targets
monopolies and oligopolies who expressly function like monopolies by achieving
collective market power through explicit agreements. But antitrust law all but
overlooks oligopolistic convergence as oligopolists can mimic one another with
impunity. Consciously parallel behavior alone is not enough to establish a Sherman
Act § 1 violation.83 Regulators must establish conspiracy through either (1) direct
evidence of an agreement or (2) sufficient circumstantial evidence supporting an
inference of agreement (by identifying “plus factors” that suggest an actual
agreement was in place).84 But the bottom line is that, in the absence of evidence of
an express agreement, regulators have little in the way of meaningful tools in their
arsenal to hold oligopolists accountable.85
The one notable exception is heightened merger review and approval processes
for prospective mergers involving oligopolists.86 Regulators can point to the extent
of market concentration as a justification for rejecting further industry consolidation
through mergers. But this power is a purely reactive and negative constraint. This
power serves only to keep the present situation from becoming worse, by blocking
mergers that would further consolidate that power or mitigating the impact of
mergers on market concentration. This approach does not address existing

83. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 227 (1993)
(“Tacit collusion, sometimes called oligopolistic price coordination or conscious parallelism,
describes the process, not in itself unlawful, by which firms in a concentrated market . . . set[]
their prices at a profit-maximizing, supracompetitive level. . . .”) (emphasis added);
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 775 (1984) (“[T]he Sherman
Act does not prohibit unreasonable restraints of trade as such—but only restraints effected by
a contract, combination, or conspiracy . . . .”); Theatre Enters., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib.
Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 541 (1954) (“[T]his Court has never held that proof of parallel business
behavior conclusively establishes agreement or, phrased differently, that such behavior itself
constitutes a Sherman Act offense.”); see also Turner, supra note 47 (arguing that § 1 should
apply only when the existence of an agreement can be proved).
84. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 768 (1984) (“[T]here must be
direct or circumstantial evidence that reasonably tends to prove that [the parties] had a
conscious commitment to a common scheme . . . .”). For discussion of plus factors commonly
seen in § 1 cases and the often ambiguous role they play in a court’s analysis, see Michael D.
Blechman, Conscious Parallelism, Signaling and Facilitating Devices: The Problem of Tacit
Collusion Under the Antitrust Laws, 24 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 881, 886–87 (1979); William E.
Kovacic, The Identification and Proof of Horizontal Agreements Under the Antitrust Laws, 38
ANTITRUST BULL. 5, 35–55 (1993).
85. See Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (“Every contract, combination . . . or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce . . . is declared to be illegal.”).
86. Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006) (prohibiting mergers and acquisitions where
“the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create
a monopoly”).
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oligopolies or market concentration through organic growth or when oligopolies
leverage their strength in one area to expand their footprint in another.
The problem is that antitrust law lacks the power to affirmatively open up
oligopoly-dominated industries to greater competition. This shortcoming leads to
predictable failure. This approach offers no response to problems inherent in
oligopolies that do not involve prohibited conduct—such as the overall drop in
gatekeeping performance or convergent standards that deepen the barriers to entry
for the industry. Antitrust law is effectively blind to these problems, which requires
defining the oligopoly problem in a new way and equipping regulators with a more
effective tool kit for addressing these issues.87
II. THE CASE FOR PREEMPTIVE OLIGOPOLY OVERSIGHT AND REGULATION
A. A Framework for Preemptive Oligopoly Regulation
This Article will suggest strategies for regulators to address this oligopoly
problem by creating a framework for preemptive regulation: the creation of
heightened disclosure requirements on oligopolists to make it easier for new entrants
to emulate their business model and treatment of smaller competitors in oligopolistic
industries as “small businesses” qualified for a range of small business regulatory
exemptions and tax incentives to foster competition and new entry. It will also
explore the merits and significant tradeoffs of using divestments to reduce market
share and overall market concentration, an approach whose shortcomings suggest the
wisdom of primarily relying on less invasive strategies to foster competition. The
logic of proposing multiple strategies is that the shortcomings of antitrust
enforcement show that there is not necessarily a “one-size-fits-all” solution to the
challenges posed by oligopolies. Instead, regulators need to be equipped with a tool
kit for ongoing or periodic oversight of oligopolies that gives them flexibility to
address market concentration in a tailored way to facilitate greater competition.
The common core for efforts to foster competition in oligopolistic markets is
establishing a baseline for government intervention to address the entrenchment of
filtering oligopolies. A logical starting point for this analysis is to understand and
adapt the framework for concentrated markets in the merger context, which provides
a reference point for what level of market concentration may merit oligopoly
scrutiny. The premise of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) market
concentration calculations under the Horizontal Merger Guidelines is that the degree

87. In the past, recognition of antitrust law’s weakness in this regard has led to proposals
for active deconcentration of oligopolies. See, e.g., Kovacic, supra note 6, at 1136–40, 1143
(outlining efforts in the 1960s and 1970s to empower antitrust law to restructure concentrated
industries and the subsequent decline in support for deconcentration as an antitrust goal); NEAL
ET AL., supra note 6. Since the 1980s, however, commentators have increasingly rejected
restructuring and divestiture as counterproductive remedies. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 6, at
175–78 (discussing the disadvantages of government-led restructuring, including the costs of
the judicial process and the long timeframes for implementing remedies); POSNER, supra note
6, at 60 (ascribing shift in opinion to “the growth of faith in . . . the efficiency . . . of the free
market and the growth of skepticism about the efficacy of ambitious government
interventions”).
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of market concentration is a proxy for the ability of firms individually or collectively
to exercise market power.88 The legal and economic logic is intuitive. The higher the
degree of market concentration among a small number of firms, the more easily that
they can either expressly cooperate or the more easily they can observe and react to
one another’s actions and engage in conscious parallelism. In contrast, in less
concentrated markets the collective action problems for collusion or conscious
parallelism will be much harder to overcome.
The (HHI) market concentration calculations serve as triggers for regulatory
review and potential divestment remedies in the merger context.89 The HHI is elegant
in its simplicity as it calculates the degree of market concentration by summing the
squares of the market share of each firm included in the market.90 But the one
important caveat is that the HHI scores are only as informative as the accuracy of the
underlying product and geographic market definitions, which turn on highly
discretionary determinations of substitutability of products and ease of entry.91
This HHI market concentration method results in scores that range from 0 (a
market consisting of an infinity of firms which each have minute market shares) to
10,000 (a complete monopoly in which a single firm has a market share of 100%).
The use of squares highlights the fact that larger firms have a disproportionate impact
on shaping pricing and in facilitating potential conscious parallelism among industry
participants. Every firm has an impact on the HHI score, although small firms have
very small effects, and the larger the firm’s market share, the bigger the effect it has
on the HHI score, which reflects its potential negative impact on competition. The
antitrust agencies’ rule of thumb is that markets are treated as “unconcentrated” when
the HHI score is below 1500, “moderately concentrated when the HHI score is
between 1500 and 2500,” and “highly concentrated when the HHI score is above
2500.”92
Generally, the FTC and DOJ will not challenge mergers where the post-merger
HHI is below 1500 unless extraordinary circumstances exist that raise
anticompetitive concerns. The logic is that markets with less than a 1500 HHI score

88. Guidelines, supra note 17, § 5.3.
89. Id.
90. The agencies’ reliance on the HHI began with the DOJ Merger Guidelines in 1982.
Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, 47 Fed. Reg. 28,493, 28,497 (June 30, 1982). The
guidelines were revised in 1984, 1992, and 2010 yet retained the HHI as the measure of market
concentration. Department of Justice 1984 Merger Guidelines, 49 Fed. Reg. 26,823, 26,830
(June 29, 1984); Department of Justice 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg.
41,552, 41,557 (Sept. 10, 1992). Since 1982, the agencies’ policies have converged, and the
2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines (HMG) reflect current FTC policy on horizontal mergers.
Guidelines, supra note 17; Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Federal Trade Commission
and Department of Justice Issue Revised Horizontal Merger Guidelines (Aug. 19, 2010),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2010/08/federal-trade-commission-usdepartment-justice-issue-revised [https://perma.cc/X4GB-DR6M].
91. See, e.g., HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND
EXECUTION 213 (2005) (criticizing HHI analysis because it creates “an appearance of great
rigor to merger analysis” and “superficially precise ‘readouts’ of market concentration” when
this framework is grounded in “assumption, conjecture, and even speculation”).
92. Herbert Hovenkamp, Appraising Merger Efficiencies, 24 GEO. MASON L. REV. 703,
730–31 (2017).
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are not concentrated enough for explicit or implicit coordination among the leading
actors to distort the market. For example, a 1500 HHI score translates into an industry
in which the leading four players each have approximately a 19% market share and
a large number of smaller players control the remaining 24% of the market.
Alternatively, a 1500 HHI score would apply to an industry where the two leading
players have 27.5% market shares and a large number of players have fractional
market shares of the rest of the market. In practice, mergers with an HHI score below
1500 effectively enjoy a “safe harbor,” while progressively higher scores receive
greater regulatory scrutiny for anticompetitive effects.
The FTC and DOJ more systematically scrutinize prospective mergers in
“moderately concentrated” markets whose HHI market concentration score falls
between 1500 and 2500. But review is not tantamount to action as the FTC and DOJ
will generally not challenge mergers which merely increase the degree of moderate
concentration unless the merger will result in a highly concentrated market (an HHI
score of 2500 or above) or unless there is additional evidence that the merger will
have anticompetitive effects. The logic for this approach is that empirical evidence
does not support a clear nexus between market concentration and market power in
this moderate concentration range, so additional evidence of anticompetitive impact
would be needed to justify antitrust agency intervention.93
For example, an industry in which the top four firms have market shares of 19%
and a large number of smaller players control the remaining 24% of the market would
have the baseline score of 1500. In contrast, a market in which the top four firms
control almost 25% of the market apiece with only minor competitors would have an
HHI score of 2500. Similarly, an industry with two leading players that have 27.5%
market shares would lead to a 1500 HHI if the other market participants only have
fractional shares. But an industry with two leading players with a 35.5% market share
and small competitors would be just above the 2500 score, signaling a highly
concentrated market. This point underscores that market participants in moderately
concentrated markets do face regulatory scrutiny but have significant flexibility in
making acquisitions.
For example, in an industry with two dominant firms each with 30% market share
and regional competitors with small market shares, one of the industry leaders could
potentially acquire a smaller competitor and gain 3% of the market. The result would
be a shift from an 1800 HHI score to a score of 1989, a 189 increase that would still
place the market well below the threshold for being highly concentrated. This
approach gives large firms the potential to make a series of small acquisitions of
early-stage companies in moderately concentrated markets but would make it much
more difficult for the acquisition of more sizable competitors.
The FTC and DOJ threshold for “highly concentrated markets” is an HHI score
above 2500.94 The agencies presume that a merger is anticompetitive if it would

93. See, e.g., Hovenkamp & Shapiro, supra note 6, at 2003–04 (discussing how this
approach reflects actual agency practice of being deferential to mergers in moderately
concentrated markets).
94. See Steven C. Salop, The Evolution and Vitality of Merger Presumptions: A DecisionTheoretic Approach, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 269, 278–79 (2015).
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result in a 200-point increase in an HHI score of 2500 or above.95 In practice that
means that a market with each of the three leading players with a 29% market share
and small competitors would be just above the 2500 score to signal a highly
concentrated market. But under the current Guidelines one of the 29% firms could
pursue a merger with a firm controlling 3% of the market because it would fall below
the 200 point presumptively anticompetitive threshold. The FTC and DOJ would still
review this merger, but the merger could potentially be approved without mandatory
divestments. When mergers in a highly concentrated market would have an effect of
greater than 200 HHI points (roughly a 4% market share increase), then the Merger
Guidelines establish that the FTC and DOJ are highly likely to challenge the
prospective merger and demand divestments, unless there is an extraordinary reason
not to.96 While the FTC and DOJ have discretion to defer to mergers under
extenuating circumstances, broadly speaking, the Guidelines establish that the
leading participants in highly concentrated markets have limited leeway in terms of
potential mergers.97
The FTC and DOJ also consider other factors that seek to place the degree of
market concentration in context. The most important of these factors is the ease of
entry into the market.98 If the reviewing agency finds that new entrants could credibly
emerge within two years to take advantage of potential post-merger price increases,
then the agency allows the merger to take place even if it is within a highly
concentrated market. The challenge with this premise is that many industries may
have only nominal barriers to entry, such as forming an online business. But in
practice new firms may face formidable barriers to build reputational capital and
overcome economies of scale.99 The inherent discretion and uncertainty in this
calculation suggests the desirability of ongoing or periodic review of oligopolies’
market power rather than the current system of one-off assessments of oligopolistic
markets in the merger context that lead to remedies for a single oligopolistic firm.

95. See Guidelines, supra note 17, § 5.3 (“Mergers resulting in highly concentrated
markets that involve an increase in the HHI of more than 200 points will be presumed to be
likely to enhance market power.”).
96. This approach is more lax than earlier approaches to policing market concentration.
Under the now defunct “leading firm proviso,” the FTC and DOJ challenged mergers that
would add even one percent to the market share of a firm that controlled at least 35% of the
market. 1984 Merger Guidelines, supra note 90, § 3.12. This presumption was rebuttable
based on the merging parties’ showing that the proposed market was poorly defined, that the
market shares exaggerate the anticompetitive effects, that new entry would mitigate any
impact on competition, or that offsetting efficiencies would keep prices at pre-merger levels
or offset any anticompetitive effects. See 4A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP,
ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 970–76
(4th ed. 2016).
97. See Salop, supra note 94, at 278–79.
98. Guidelines, supra note 17, § 9. (“[I]f entry into the market is so easy that the merged
firm and its remaining rivals in the market, either unilaterally or collectively, could not
profitably raise price or otherwise reduce competition compared to the level that
would prevail in the absence of the merger. ”).
99. See id. (discussing the need to consider the potential for product substitution, i.e.,
revamping existing facilities to enter a new market or the challenges of creating new facilities
out of whole cloth).
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The FTC and DOJ can consider the significance of changing market conditions
that may threaten to erode the market dominance of existing firms. For example,
technological changes in online streaming may render dominance in DVD
production less significant and justify allowing mergers for even greater
consolidation of the concentrated DVD production market because the nature of the
market itself is in flux as new streaming technologies become closer substitutes. The
FTC and DOJ are also more deferential to market consolidation that is a product of
financial weakness.100 If either the purchaser, the target, or both are in a weakened
financial condition, then the FTC and DOJ may conclude that the current market
share of each firm is less significant and allow mergers to proceed in concentrated
markets that would otherwise not be permissible.101
The Merger Guidelines also allow the FTC and DOJ to consider the potential
efficiencies created by a merger as a mitigating factor if the merging parties can
produce “clear and convincing” evidence that such efficiencies exist that can increase
competitiveness and enhance consumer welfare.102 The underlying premise is that
the more significant the potential impact on competition, the more the merging
parties need to identify anticipated efficiencies. Projected efficiencies can come from
greater economies of scale and lower administrative and overhead costs from
consolidation of operations. In theory, the FTC and DOJ are supposed to reject
efficiency claims if the parties can achieve efficiency benefits without engaging in
the merger, such as each firm’s cutting administrative and overhead costs on its own.
But in practice, both the claimed efficiencies from the mergers or unilateral
efficiencies are difficult to substantiate, which gives the FTC and DOJ broad
discretion to make exceptions in the name of efficiency benefits.103
Lastly, the FTC and DOJ can consider the likelihood of barriers against industry
cooperation as a mitigating factor to allow mergers to proceed.104 The ability of actors
to collude appears implicit in the nature of concentrated markets, but the logic is that
if sustainable barriers exist to thwart collusion then the degree of market
concentration may be less important in the merger review decision. For example, it
is possible that multiple actors compete in a concentrated market but utilize distinct
methods or products whose pricing cannot be easily compared. Think of the medical
device industry in which often multiple manufacturers produce patent-protected

100. Id. § 11.
101. See, e.g., FTC v. National Tea Co., 603 F.2d 694, 698–99 (8th Cir. 1979) (allowing a
merger to proceed when the acquirer produced evidence of financial weakness, poor
competitive position, and plans to leave geographic market at issue for acquisition); United
States v. Int'l Harvester Co., 564 F.2d 769, 773–75 (7th Cir. 1977) (authorizing a merger when
the target company suffered financial and competitive weakness that threatened its ability to
compete).
102. Guidelines, supra note 17, § 10.
103. The extent of discretion is captured well by the seminal (pre-Guidelines) case, United
States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 371–72 (1963), which held that if every
potentially anticompetitive merger could be saved by an “ultimate reckoning of social or
economic debits and credits,” then “the logical upshot would be that every firm in an industry
could . . . embark on a series of mergers that would make it in the end as large as the industry
leader.”
104. Guidelines, supra note 17, § 7.1.
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devices that perform convergent functions through different means. Alternatively,
the ease of collusion may be more evident in industries which produce homogeneous
products with transparent pricing that market participants can readily monitor.
B. The Desirability of Ongoing Oversight Rather Than One-Off Merger Review
One of the primary challenges with the existing merger review process is its oneoff nature. The discussion of potential mitigating efficiencies highlights this point.
Merging parties need to identify efficiencies from the merger that will ostensibly
increase competition and consumer welfare in the long run. But the merging parties
face no accountability if their projections turn out to be overstated or incorrect as the
only time that these assessments matter is at the time of merger review. There is
simply no provision for a one-, two-, or three-year look back to see if the promised
efficiencies actually materialize because there is no ongoing oversight of
oligopolistic markets.
An apt analogy is to the shortcomings of cost-benefit analysis of prospective rules
and regulations. Ex ante government regulators can only engage in informed
speculation as to the costs and benefits of a given regulation. This fact may naturally
lead regulators to be overly optimistic about a regulation’s benefits and to downplay
systematically the costs. Because the relevant point in time for cost-benefit analysis
occurs before the implementation of the rule, there is no way to know for sure to
what extent the costs and benefits will materialize, and there is no systematic review
process to assess whether the calculations of regulatory value truly were worth it.105
The difference with the regulatory context is that in theory regulators can revisit
the costs and benefits of existing regulations and modify rules and regulations if they
are not living up to their intended goals. If the partisan composition of the Securities
& Exchange Commission commissioners changes, the SEC can revisit any rule or
regulation and is only constrained by the timeline and costs associated with the
rulemaking process. In contrast, the nature of FTC and DOJ merger review is that
neither agency can revisit their analysis until confronted with another merger
affecting a given industry. So, if the assessments of projected efficiencies are
incorrect, the absence of ongoing or periodic oversight leaves the agencies powerless
to address the impact on competition.
Part of the challenge of creating ongoing or periodic review of concentrated
markets is that regulators are unaccustomed to playing that role. Merger reviews have
traditionally “monopolized” the attention of regulators at the FTC and DOJ when it
comes to oligopolistic markets, especially since the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act of 1976.
Changing to ongoing or periodic review of highly concentrated markets may require
the development of greater agency expertise on the affected markets as well as
management of information flows to ensure that the agencies can effectively oversee
this mandate. This approach may also require greater coordination with the primary
regulators of oligopolistic industries that fall under greater antitrust scrutiny. But

105. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, The Regulatory Lookback, 94 B.U. L. REV. 579, 590–94 (2014)
(discussing Cass Sunstein’s efforts while leading the Obama administration’s Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs to review the burdens created by antiquated rules that
slowed economic growth).
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these problems are surmountable budgetary and human capital issues. The bigger
challenge is making the case that periodic review of oligopolies is workable and can
be used to foster greater competition in oligopolistic markets.
C. The Value of the HHI Highly Concentrated Market Measure
One challenge policymakers would face is determining what the trigger for
regulatory scrutiny should be if ongoing or periodic anti-trust review of oligopolistic
markets were implemented. It would unrealistically strain agency resources to
require the FTC or the DOJ to review every industry systematically for evidence of
anticompetitive activity. That is part of the logic of the existing system of merger
review because a pending merger forces the FTC and DOJ to wrestle with a
potentially significant shift in market concentration for a given industry. But the
simple way of thinking about this issue is that mergers are akin to avulsions—onetime shifts that get regulators attention—while the growing problem in the economy
is the issue of market concentration accretion—gradual shifts in market
concentration, which over time entrench the dominant oligopolists. But avulsions
and accretions may end up having the same effect in increasing market concentration
and, therefore, may merit an equal amount of scrutiny.
Instead of trying to come up with a completely new marker for what additional
signals of market concentration would merit greater scrutiny by antitrust regulators,
regulators could build off of the existing Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for
market concentration. The HHI index provides a baseline of 2500 for a “highly
concentrated” market.106 While the HHI focuses on the relative impact of mergers on
market concentration, this baseline for “highly concentrated” markets serves as a
proxy for oligopolistic dominance, which may require greater scrutiny and potential
remedial action.107 For that reason, it would provide a sensible trigger for ongoing
or periodic review. The underlying premise is the need for regular review of market
activity at this level of concentration because of the intrinsic danger of collusion or
conscious parallelism when a few dominant players dominate the market.
To put the 2500 HHI highly concentrated market score in context, that would be
the equivalent of a market in which two dominant players had a 35.5% market share
each with small fractional market shares for the other competitors. Alternatively, a
market with three leading players with a 29% market share and small competitors
would be just above the 2500 score to signal a highly concentrated market. When
mergers in a highly concentrated market would have an effect of greater than 200
HHI points (roughly 4% market share increase), then the Merger Guidelines establish
that the FTC and DOJ are highly likely to challenge the prospective merger and
demand divestments, unless there is an extraordinary reason not to. The underlying
rationale for using the HHI score of 2500 as a proxy for oligopoly is that, at
minimum, such a highly concentrated market merits greater regulatory scrutiny
because of the increased potential for tacit collusion among industry participants.
Another justification for using a 2500 HHI score as a trigger for regulatory review
is that there are a number of different types of activities that could affect a highly

106. See Guidelines, supra note 17, § 5.3.
107. See id.; Department of Justice 1984 Merger Guidelines, supra note 90, at 26,830–31.
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concentrated market that could have the same economic effects as a merger. For
example, the exit from the market or even the decline in relative market share of a
smaller competitor could have the same effect on the market as a whole as a merger
or acquisition by a large player. For example, imagine a market in which three firms
each enjoyed a 29% market share and only one firm had a 6% market share with the
rest of the market being controlled by local firms with small fractional market shares.
This landscape would lead to an HHI of 2559, a highly concentrated, oligopolistic
market. If the 6% market share firm went out of business and stopped all production,
then the market share of the remaining three dominant firms would increase to
approximately 31%, which would create an HHI score of 2883, a dramatic increase
of 324 in market concentration.
If this type of increase in market concentration took place through a merger, the
FTC or DOJ would scrutinize the changes closely and be very likely to impose
divestment remedies in an attempt to restore the market to the pre-merger level of
competition. If anything, the failure of a smaller firm should justify regulatory
scrutiny of the anticompetitive effects on the market even more since it would
highlight the inability of a smaller competitor with some degree of scale to compete
with the dominant oligopolists. But under the current system the exit from the market
of a small player would receive no regulatory scrutiny at all, until or unless a
dominant market player engaged in a subsequent merger that would trigger review
of the impact of the merger on the regulatory landscape. In other words, if a dominant
player bought up the failed smaller competitor in a “fire sale,” then the FTC and DOJ
would review the merger’s effect on overall market concentration and potentially
order divestments to remedy the competitive impact. However, the antitrust
regulators would do nothing if the dominant players simply stood by and let the
smaller competitor fail and its production cease and simply assumed larger
percentages of market share over a market that did not contain the failed competitor’s
products. Ironically, even review of a “fire sale” purchase may miss the full story as
by that point the target company’s market share may already have dwindled down
far enough to where its acquisition appears to be of little consequence to overall
market concentration.
The failure of companies attracts headlines and attention and, therefore, it would
seem plausible for the FTC to be in a position to monitor market exits in highly
concentrated markets in an ongoing or periodic way. The conclusion from the
analysis may be that the failure of an industry participant simply reflects the market
success of the leading industry players. But it would be worthwhile for regulators at
least to wrestle with the concern that the highly concentrated market itself is the
problem in vesting the leading players with market power, which would suggest the
desirability of trying to level the playing field for smaller participants to promote
competition.
The same logic would apply to increases in market share through organic growth,
which similarly escapes regulatory scrutiny under the current antitrust system. For
example, if Amazon grew its e-commerce market share through strategic
acquisitions, then those acquisitions would be subject to regulatory scrutiny.
Amazon’s growth has entailed some mergers, such as the multi-billion-dollar
purchase of Whole Foods, which regulators did investigate and resulted in some
minor divestments to remedy regulators’ concerns about the impact of the merger on
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regional markets.108 But Whole Foods’ online market share was small, and regulators
primarily focused on the impact of the merger on the supermarket landscape rather
than on e-commerce. Most of Amazon’s remarkable growth has occurred organically
through reinvesting revenues back into its online business and its distribution
network, as well as making strategic investments.109 That activity has largely avoided
antitrust regulatory scrutiny because it has not entailed the merger trigger for
regulatory review, even though the largely organic growth of Amazon’s market share
would incur regulatory scrutiny for increasing e-commerce HHI scores above 2500
were this growth taking place through mergers. The question this Article poses is that
if either the exit or decline of a small competitor or organic growth has the same
impact on highly concentrated markets as a merger, why should these similar impacts
on markets be treated differently by regulators? The introduction of ongoing or
periodic review would position regulators to treat economically similar changes in
similar ways to anticipate and address potential anticompetitive effects.
D. Leveling the Regulatory Playing Field
The limitations of conventional antitrust regulation of oligopolies and the
durability of oligopolistic entrenchment suggest the desirability of exploring
alternative strategies to address this issue. I argue that the overarching theme of
oligopoly regulation should be to level the playing field for smaller competitors.
Oligopolies present a context of market failure in which the entrenchment of the
dominant players potentially thwarts competition from smaller players and new
entrants. Regulations paradoxically may deepen the hold that oligopolies have over
the market by adding additional costs and burdens that disproportionately
disadvantage smaller players and prospective new entrants who do not enjoy the
economies of scale of their larger competitors.
1. The Case for Heightening Oligopolist Disclosures
One strategy antitrust regulators should consider would be to increase the burdens
that larger companies face in oligopolistic markets. A context in which this strategy
could be potentially productive is public company disclosures. The premise of public
company disclosure rules is the desirability of overcoming collective action problems
for investors and ensuring uniformity of information flows. The collateral benefit is
that periodic public company disclosures provide information access for competitors

108. See Nick Wingfield & Michael J. de la Merced, Amazon to Buy Whole Foods for $13.4
Billion, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (June 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/16
/business/dealbook/amazon-whole-foods.html [https://perma.cc/ZQB4-YSVU] (discussing
how Amazon would have only 3.5% of the grocery market after the acquisition of Whole
Foods, so significant divestments were unlikely to occur during the merger review process).
109. E.g., Lauren Feiner, Amazon is Spending Billions on Internet Satellites, Self-Driving
Cars and More as Revenue Growth Slows, CNBC (May 17, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com
/2019/05/17/amazon-makes-several-start-up-investments-revenue-growth-slows.html [https:/
/perma.cc/2Z4J-P7QZ] (discussing Amazon’s organic growth and broad spectrum of strategic
investments).
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and for regulators to monitor regulatory compliance.110 Ironically, public company
information flows have the potential to facilitate oligopolistic behavior by making it
easier for competitors to monitor what one another is doing. But the offsetting benefit
is that smaller competitors can potentially leverage larger established companies’
disclosures to equip them to compete more effectively. Existing disclosures alone do
not appear sufficient to offset the prevalence and entrenchment of oligopolies, since
the overwhelming majority of filtering oligopolists are publicly traded companies
who often compete with smaller, privately held companies that do not have to make
public company disclosures.
In theory, oligopolists could face more comprehensive disclosure obligations that
go beyond the minimum disclosures for public companies set by the SEC. The logic
is that regulators already have the power to demand broad flows of information from
regulated parties to facilitate monitoring of regulatory compliance. Making these
types of information flows more systematic and public for oligopolists would foster
more effective regulatory accountability and greater competition. It would also be
valuable for oligopolists to face mandates for disclosures of more detailed forwardlooking information, addressing issues such as research and development, expansion
plans, and investment projections in corporate infrastructure. Giving smaller
competitors access to these types of information would not level the playing field by
itself, but this approach would make it easier for smaller firms and new entrants to
develop strategies on how best to compete.
Another option would be to empower antitrust regulators to craft industry-specific
disclosures that could make it easier for both regulators and smaller competitors to
monitor the entrenched oligopolists to guard against anticompetitive behavior and
facilitate competition. For example, the type of disclosures that are useful in the
rating agency context may be far different than what would be valuable for regulators
and smaller competitors to know in the e-commerce context. But in a public company
disclosure system that treats all industries as the same, regulators have failed to
recognize the value of greater industry-specific transparency for both regulators and
smaller competitors. This approach would require antitrust regulators to understand
the industries they are overseeing in greater depth to be able to identify which types
of additional disclosures could add value for both regulating oligopolists and
increasing competition.
Another alternative would be to treat all oligopolists as public companies for
disclosure purposes regardless of whether they are privately held. Many, if not most,
oligopolists have assumed such a large size that they have evolved into public
companies to gain access to the broad liquidity access that public companies enjoy.
But treating all oligopolists as public companies for disclosure purposes would
recognize that there is a potential regulatory and competitive value of having greater
transparency of oligopolists. The underlying premise is that public company
disclosures are a public good whose value to regulators, competitors, and the public
writ large extends far beyond managerial accountability to the given company’s

110. See, e.g., Allen Ferrell, The Case for Mandatory Disclosure in Securities Regulation
Around the World, 2 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 81, 82–85 (2007) (discussing the rationale
and criticisms of mandatory disclosure rules in securities regulation).
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investors.111 The distinctive challenges of addressing the anticompetitive and anticonsumer dimensions of oligopolies could justify this effort to heighten scrutiny of
oligopolies by imposing public company disclosures. The SEC could ensure the
accuracy of these disclosures through the threat of public Rule 10b-5 suits if there
are materially misleading disclosures or omissions (even in the absence of public
shareholders). As I mentioned earlier, there is the danger that transparency could play
into the hands of oligopolists by making it easier for the leading players in an industry
to monitor one another’s actions. But disclosure-based transparency is a two-edged
sword that also would provide regulators and existing and prospective smaller
competitors with the ability to assess the industry landscape in greater detail.
2. The Potential for a “Small Business” Exemption Approach
Another potential strategy would be to lighten the burdens that smaller players or
prospective new entrants in oligopolistic industries face by treating them as the
equivalents of small businesses, regardless of their size. The logic is that making
smaller market participants eligible for existing or tailored small business
exemptions would help to offset the advantages entrenched oligopolists enjoy and
mitigate the regulatory obstacles that smaller competitors and new entrants face. One
of the paradoxes of regulation is that larger companies benefit from and may push
for regulation because of the higher burden regulatory compliance places on smaller
firms and prospective new entrants.112The more invasive the regulation, the harder
for small producers to compete because regulations magnify smaller companies’
already higher-per-unit cost of production. The same logic applies to prospective new
entrants who often face greater barriers to entry because of the costs involved in
regulatory compliance.
One way to frame this issue is to conceptualize regulation as a regressive tax on
companies that disproportionately falls on smaller firms. This framing is not meant
to dismiss the potential significance of regulation in terms of public benefits but
rather to recognize that regulations impose costs that smaller firms can less easily
internalize than their larger competitors. Because of competition from larger firms
with economies of scale, smaller firms are unlikely to be able to pass the higher costs
imposed by regulatory compliance on to customers in the form of higher prices.

111. Cf. Jennifer S. Fan, Regulating Unicorns: Disclosure and the New Private Economy,
57 B.C. L. REV. 583, 584–85 (2016) (arguing that once a private company reaches a billiondollar capitalization it should be subject to public company disclosure rules to increase
transparency and protect minority investors).
112. See, e.g., THOMAS O. MCGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF
REGULATORY ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY 115–16 (1991) (discussing how large
companies ironically push for regulation to establish barriers to entry for prospective
competitors); James L. Huffman, The Impact of Regulation on Small and Emerging
Businesses, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 307, 310–12 (2000) (discussing how the rise of
the administrative state entrenched larger businesses at the expense of their smaller
competitors); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. &
MGMT. SCI. 3, 3–5 (1971) (discussing how industry leaders can leverage regulation to
marginalize smaller competitors).
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Small business exemptions are widespread throughout federal and state statutes
and regulations, but they vary significantly in terms of what threshold companies
must meet to benefit from lower regulatory burdens, as well as the scope of the
exemptions. For example, only mergers with a combined value of over $200 million
are subject to review by the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of
Justice, while, in contrast, small business exemptions under labor law exist only for
firms with less than $500,000 in annual revenues.113 But if there is one common
theme of genuine bipartisanship, it is politicians’ calls for an ever-expanding number
of small business exemptions to foster economic growth.114 For this reason, Congress
enacted the Regulatory Flexibility Act115 and the Small Business Regulatory
Enforcement Fairness Act, which require regulators systematically to consider
lowering burdens on small businesses or exempting them entirely from rules and
regulations.116
The landscape of regulatory treatment of small business is remarkably varied with
comprehensive exemptions, partial exemptions, and exemptions of particular
requirements based on the greater burdens imposed on small businesses. The criteria
for small business exemption eligibility also varies widely with small size being
measured differently in a range of contexts, such as by market share or the number
of employees, income, assets, accounts, transactions, or shareholders.117 The
underlying point is that “small business” is already an elastic term tailored to fit the

113. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 18a(d)(1) (imposing the HSR merger review requirement on all
companies whose combined value would be over $200 million except for certain categories of
exempted companies); 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g)(1)(B) as modified by 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-1
(registration under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 required for companies with total
assets exceeding $10 million and a class of equity securities held of record by 500 or more
shareholders); 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1) (excluding from the definition of “[e]nterprise engaged
in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce,” and therefore from enterprise
coverage under the Fair Labor Standards Act, entities with a gross volume of business less
than $500,000); 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b)(2) (2003) (exempting securities offerings from
registration under the Securities Act of 1933 if, among other conditions, the amount of the
offering does not exceed $1 million).
114. See, e.g., Robert A. Peterson, George Kozmetsky & Nancy M. Ridgway, Opinions
About Government Regulation of Small Business, 22 J. SMALL BUS. MGMT. 56, 59–61 (1984)
(discussing how public opinion polls have consistently demonstrated favorable views towards
small business exemptions and reduced regulation).
115. 5 U.S.C. §§ 601–612; see also Paul R. Verkuil, A Critical Guide to the Regulatory
Flexibility Act, 1982 DUKE L.J. 213 (1982) (discussing the features of the Regulatory
Flexibility Act).
116. 5 U.S.C. § 601; see also Thomas O. Sargentich, The Small Business Regulatory
Enforcement Fairness Act, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 123 (1997) (discussing the requirements
regulators face to consider small business exemptions).
117. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (defining as “employers” covered by the
Americans with Disabilities Act only persons with 15 or more employees); 29 U.S.C. §
1161(b) (exempting group health plans from the continuation coverage requirement of ERISA
if the employers covered by the plan have fewer than 20 employees); 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)
(excluding an adviser from the registration requirements of the Investment Advisers Act who,
among other requirements, has fewer than 15 clients).
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particular regulatory context, which would lend itself well to being interpreted in a
broad way in the oligopoly context.
There are clear precedents for expanding the scope of small business exemptions,
even for players that may not typically have the size to qualify for conventional small
business exemptions. The most notable example would be the JOBS Act creation of
the “emerging growth company” designation that is designed to encourage more
initial public offerings by lowering the disclosure standards for first-time issuer
companies with less than one billion dollars in annual revenue.118 The logic is that
many “unicorns,” companies with market valuations over one billion dollars, have
been content to rely on the private placement market for their capital needs and
steered clear of public capital markets and the sweeping disclosure rules that come
with that status.119 By subjecting “emerging growth companies” to lower disclosure
standards until they have assumed a larger size or been publicly listed for five years,
the hope is that these companies will enter public capital markets and give the public
writ large the opportunity to participate in these companies’ growth, rather than
limiting participation to well-heeled accredited investors and institutions.
The logic underpinning small business exemptions is straightforward. Size is
relevant when it comes to the burdens of federal and state regulation because of the
degree of fixed compliance costs inherent in statutes and regulations and the role of
economies of scale in mitigating the impact of regulations on companies’ bottom
line.120 For example, any regulation may entail fixed costs that have no relation to
outputs, which results in a higher per unit cost for smaller firms. Think of
environmental regulation compliance that may require the use of technologies to
mitigate environmental impact that either have no direct correlation to outputs or are
much more expensive on a per unit basis for smaller producers. Smaller firms are
also disadvantaged in terms of the costs of monitoring regulatory responsibilities as
well as documenting and reporting compliance.121 Lawyers understand that issue
intuitively as many legal and internal control functions have high fixed costs
regardless of the size of the client. For example, the core disclosure requirements for
small-scale private placements (of up to $1 million a year) under Rule 504 of
Regulation D are generally fixed and vary little from the disclosure requirements
larger players may use under Rule 506 of Regulation D to raise unlimited amounts

118. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
119. See Fan, supra note 111, at 585–88 (discussing the significant increase in the number
of “unicorns”); see also Evelyn M. Rusli, Startup Values Set Records, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 29,
2014, 7:50 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/tech-startup-values-reach-the-sky-1419900636
[https://perma.cc/Y7RJ-5YMN] (discussing how the scale of private placements for start-ups
has come to rival the initial public offering market).
120. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. BROCK & DAVID S. EVANS, THE ECONOMICS OF SMALL
BUSINESSES: THEIR ROLE AND REGULATION IN THE U.S. ECONOMY 65–67 (1986) (discussing
the significance of economies of scale in making regulatory burdens more manageable for
larger companies).
121. See, e.g., RICHARD LESHER, MELTDOWN ON MAIN STREET: WHY SMALL BUSINESS IS
LEADING THE REVOLUTION AGAINST BIG GOVERNMENT 35–36 (1996) (discussing how record
keeping and reporting requirements imposed by regulations are as burdensome as substantive
compliance with the actual regulations themselves).
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of funds from accredited investors.122 Economies of scale also matter with variable
costs as larger firms may be able to spread out variable costs more effectively over
the larger scale of their production.123
One approach to empower smaller competitors in oligopolistic markets would be
to allow antitrust regulators to designate the competitors as eligible for a broad range
of existing small business exemptions by stipulating that they are “small businesses”
for federal regulatory purposes. The appeal of this approach would be its simplicity
in leveraging the existing small business exemption landscape to make smaller firms
more competitive. It would also have the value of bypassing the need for large-scale
interagency coordination in determining eligibility for a given regulator’s set of small
business exemptions or reduced regulatory burdens, which would be a timeconsuming and costly process to navigate. The potential downside of a blanket
strategy of designating the smaller competitors of oligopolists as small businesses
for all federal regulatory purposes is that some regulations, such as labor law
protections, may impose additional costs but may well be justified in having a broadbased application. For this reason, it may make sense to designate certain categories
of small business exemptions or reduced regulations that smaller competitors of
oligopolists would qualify for, while recognizing that the public interest
underpinning other categories of regulation should continue to apply.
A related alternative is to design a new set of small business exemptions that
would apply to smaller competitors in oligopolistic markets, such as lowered
disclosure obligations, or to create small business exemptions that are tailored to
address the regulatory barriers and public interests in particular oligopolistic
industries, such as accounting or e-commerce. Either of these approaches would be
consistent with the Regulatory Flexibility Act124 and the Small Business Regulatory
Enforcement Fairness Act, which require regulators systematically to consider
lowering burdens on small businesses or exempting them entirely from rules and
regulations.125 It may not be necessary for new authority to be put into place to shift
toward a framework in which non-oligopolists could be given regulatory advantages
in oligopolistic markets.
For example, Section 23(a)(2) of the Exchange Act requires the SEC to consider
the impact that adopting a new rule will have on competition and to consider whether
any impact on competition is necessary or in the public interest. This requirement is
imposed on the Commission’s exercise of discretionary authority, such as with
respect to its consideration of requests for exemptive relief. Section 3(f) of the
Exchange Act requires the SEC to consider the impact that new rules will have on
investor protection, competition, efficiency, and capital formation. A number of
cases overturning SEC rules have interpreted these requirements as imposing a form
of cost-benefit analysis in rulemaking, which could potentially encompass

122. C. Steven Bradford, Securities Regulation and Small Business: Rule 504 and the Case
for an Unconditional Exemption, 5 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 1, 23–29 (2001) (discussing
the significance of the fixed costs of disclosure rules for private placements).
123. See BARRY A. STEIN, SIZE, EFFICIENCY, AND COMMUNITY ENTERPRISE 8–10 (1974).
124. 5 U.S.C. §§ 601–612; see also Verkuil, supra note 115 (discussing the features of the
Regulatory Flexibility Act).
125. 5 U.S.C. § 601; see also Sargentich, supra note 116 (discussing the requirements
regulators face to consider small business exemptions).
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considerations of the differential impact of regulations on competition by smaller
participants in oligopolistic markets.126 These provisions only apply in the public
company context or when a private company is applying to the SEC for accreditation
to serve in a quasi-public role, such as a nationally recognized statistical rating
organization. Because SEC disclosures and the related antifraud liability exposure
form some of the most onerous regulatory burdens, requirements for the SEC to
consider the impact of its rules on competition fit in well with the logic of lightening
the regulatory burden on non-oligopolists in oligopolistic markets.
Either strategy of granting antitrust regulators discretion in terms of either
designating smaller competitors as “small businesses” that qualify for existing
exemptions or tailoring new small business exemptions for non-oligopolists has the
potential to foster greater competition and to attract new entrants to oligopolistic
industries. The challenge for regulators would be to experiment in seeing how the
use of small business exemptions could affect the entrenchment of existing
oligopolists and decrease market concentration. Because small business exemptions
have not been used in the past to try to address oligopolistic dominance, employing
a variety of broad, narrow, and tailored small business exemptions in different
oligopolistic markets would be useful in giving data points for assessing the viability
of this approach.
3. An Oligopoly Tax Versus Oligopoly Tax Relief
The case for giving smaller players in oligopolistic markets tax advantages builds
on the larger case for granting exemptions and lower regulatory burdens for small
competitors. The paradigm case for this analysis is the exemptions from state sales
taxes that were historically given to online businesses which did not have any
physical presence within the state in which the e-commerce customer resides.127 This
exemption gave the once fledgling online world systematic economic advantages
over its brick-and-mortar competitors in order to encourage the growth of online
commerce. But once dominant online players emerged, the sales tax exemption
served to reinforce the cost advantages online actors had over their brick-and-mortar
counterparts. The irony of Amazon is that once it launched its strategy of building a
comprehensive national network of distribution centers, it became subject to sales
taxes for transactions with customers in the many states Amazon has a physical
presence.128 Since Amazon already had the economies of scale to out-compete both
brick and mortar firms and smaller online competitors, Amazon joined forces with

126. See, e.g., Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
127. See, e.g., R. Lainie W. Harris, Did the Supreme Court Do Congress’s Dirty Work
When It Killed Quill? States Sales Tax on Remote Sellers and Wayfair, 72 TAX L. 671, 672–
73 (2019) (discussing how prior to the Wayfair case a judicially created bright-line rule
prevented requirements for remote sellers engaged in interstate commerce to engage in state
sales tax collection).
128. Jean-Francois Houde, Peter Newberry & Katja Seim, Economies of Density in ECommerce: A Study of Amazon’s Fulfillment Center Network, 1–2 (May 1, 2017), https:/
/faculty.wharton.upenn.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/amazon_tax.pdf [https://perma.cc
/W8LS-VSLW] (discussing how the creation of fulfillment centers exposed Amazon to state
sales taxes).
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sales-tax-hungry states to have sales taxes imposed on e-commerce.129 The logic was
that by doing so Amazon could pull the ladder that it used to achieve success to
ensure that no emerging competitor could leverage this economic advantage to
outflank Amazon.
After years of state legislative wrangling and litigation, South Dakota v. Wayfair,
Inc. upended the e-commerce sales tax exemption by holding that out-of-state
retailers must collect sales tax on purchases sent to state residents, even if the out-ofstate retailer has no physical presence in the state.130 The ironic implication of this
change has been to reinforce the dominance of the leading e-commerce players that
used this favorable tax treatment to gain market share from brick and mortar stores
and now no longer have to worry that this tax loophole can empower smaller
competitors. To address the example at hand, one potential solution for highly
concentrated markets would be to introduce a sales tax exemption for smaller
competitors to try to level the playing field for them with the dominant oligopolists.
Some states, such as Virginia, already have small business sales tax exemptions for
out-of-state e-commerce retailers, but with a low threshold for eligibility, which in
Virginia is less than $100,000 in annual sales to Virginia residents.131 Extending this
exemption to a broader spectrum of non-oligopolist firms in a highly concentrated
industry could help to increase competition in e-commerce.
A shortcoming of this approach is that it would require a multistate compact or
action by a myriad of individual states to address a federal antitrust problem.132 A
more viable alternative would be to consider the merits of an alternative minimum
corporate tax that would apply to the dominant players in oligopolistic industries or
a small business tax exemption that would lower federal corporate taxes for smaller
competitors in highly concentrated markets.133 As discussed earlier, regulations often
serve as a regressive tax that disproportionately affects smaller market participants
because of the higher costs of regulatory compliance for lower output producers. But
tailoring tax treatment as a tool to remedy market concentration has the potential to
offset the economic advantages that oligopolists enjoy.

129. Darla Mercado, 10 More States Will Now Collect Sales Taxes from Amazon Shoppers,
CNBC (Feb. 1, 2017, 1:20 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/02/01/10-more-states-will-nowcollect-sales-taxes-from-amazon.html [https://perma.cc/DNC2-HA7U].
130. 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018).
131. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-612 (2020).
132. The issue of collecting sales taxes on online, interstate purchases did spark an effort
to solve the problem through an interstate compact, which suggests the potential plausibility
of creating an interstate compact for a small company tax exemption in industries with
oligopolistic dominance. See, e.g., Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement, STREAMLINED
SALES TAX GOVERNING BOARD, INC., https://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/docs/defaultsource/agreement/ssuta/ssuta-as-amended-2018-12-14.pdf?sfvrsn=8a83c020_6
[https:/
/perma.cc/ZZ99-8KA6] (last updated Dec. 14, 2018); An Overview and Guide for State
Lawmakers and Tax Administrators Explaining the Streamlined Sales Tax Project,
STREAMLINED SALES TAX GOVERNING BOARD, INC., https://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/docs
/default-source/guides/state-guide-to-streamlined-sales-tax-project-2019-03-01.pdf?sfvrsn
=5cc921f2_4 [https://perma.cc/57SB-DFJ2] (last updated March 1, 2019).
133. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Case for Retaining the Corporate AMT, 56 SMU L. REV.
333, 334–38 (2003) (providing an overview of the current corporate alternative minimum tax
and its underlying policy rationales).
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Corporate tax is notorious for the extent of tax credit and deduction loopholes that
corporations can and do exploit to keep their tax burdens far below the nominal 21%
federal corporate tax rate.134 For example, Amazon paid no corporate tax in 2017 and
2018 and paid corporate tax at a paltry 1.2% rate in 2019.135 Add on Amazon’s wellknown propensity to leverage its market power to shake down states and localities
for tax incentives for locating offices and warehouses,136 and there is a clear story in
which Amazon’s scale and insulation from taxation has helped to reinforce its ecommerce dominance. In contrast, Walmart, one of Amazon’s leading e-commerce
competitors, had a corporate tax rate of 25% and 25.5% in 2017 and 2018 (when the
corporate tax rate was 35%) and paid an effective rate of 19.3% in 2019, which is
modestly below the newly created 21% federal corporate tax rate. Part of the
explanation for this vast difference in tax exposure are the lower corporate income
of Amazon compared to Walmart, Amazon’s reinvestment in its distribution
infrastructure, and the greater ease of an online company to choose the most
favorable tax jurisdiction for revenue recognition.137
What is interesting about this contrast is that Amazon would be far more affected
by an alternative minimum corporate tax for oligopolists than Walmart. But the
underlying logic would be akin to the alternative minimum tax for individuals—
limiting the ability of the wealthy to exploit tax credit and deduction loopholes.138
The particular concern in the oligopoly context is that the market power oligopolists
enjoy gives them greater leverage to secure favorable tax treatment at the federal,
state, and local level, as well as to secure tax subsidies from localities. Having a
uniform baseline of tax exposure would help to offset that advantage and make it
easier for smaller market participants to compete. While in theory, an alternative
minimum corporate tax could be tailored for the particulars of a given market, from
an ease of administration perspective, it would make more sense to establish a
uniform alternative minimum corporate tax that would apply to the leading players
in any highly concentrated market.
Another alternative would be to provide tax relief to smaller competitors in
oligopolistic markets in order to foster competition. This approach would be a variant
of the small business exemptions that are widespread in many areas of regulation.
Thinking back to the contrast of Amazon and Walmart, Walmart would benefit from

134. See Heather M. Field, A Taxonomy for Tax Loopholes, 55 HOUS. L. REV. 545, 552–
60 (2018) (providing an overview of corporate tax loopholes).
135. Tom Huddleston Jr., Amazon Had to Pay Federal Income Taxes for the First Time
Since 2016—Here’s How Much, CNBC (Feb. 4, 2020, 3:19 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020
/02/04/amazon-had-to-pay-federal-income-taxes-for-the-first-time-since-2016.html [https:/
/perma.cc/D5X8-CPSK] (providing an overview of Amazon’s recent federal corporate tax
exposure).
136. Hayes R. Holderness, The Unexpected Role of Tax Salience in State Competition for
Businesses, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 1091, 1092–93 (2017) (discussing Amazon’s success in
extracting tax incentives for investments).
137. See Justin Fox, Some Corporations Pay a Lot More Taxes Than Others, BLOOMBERG,
OPINION (Sept. 19, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2017-09-19
/why-wal-mart-pays-a-lot-more-in-taxes-than-amazon [https://perma.cc/2CZ5-EZHV].
138. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 133, at 336–38 (explaining the policy rationales that
underpin the corporate alternative minimum tax).
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subjecting e-commerce competitors to an alternative minimum tax and would face
only marginally more tax exposure as Walmart already pays federal corporate tax
that is close to the current 21% tax rate. This same problem may arise in other highly
concentrated markets in which the market power of the oligopolists does not
necessarily show up in terms of reduced exposure to corporate tax based on the nature
of the product. For this reason, providing oligopoly tax relief for smaller players and
prospective new entrants may offer a more plausible way to offset the dominance of
oligopolists.
Congress routinely grants tax relief for particular industries in the name of
protecting jobs or incentivizing investment. The current calls for tax relief for
airlines, cruises, and travel businesses illustrate this point.139 The proposed
coronavirus tax relief is expressly focusing on giving the greatest tax relief to small
businesses connected to these industries. This approach is consistent with oligopoly
tax relief that would be expressly designed to incentivize competition and new
entrants to reduce the degree of concentration in oligopolistic markets. This tax relief
could be phased out once the FTC or DOJ certifies that the given industry no longer
falls in the 2500 HHI score category of being a highly concentrated market. That
approach would be consistent with other tax incentives that exist until an agency
certifies that the particular catalyst for the relief no longer applies.
The question of the extent of oligopoly tax relief could well turn on the degree of
market concentration. It would be logical to offer the greatest tax relief in an industry
such as rating agencies in which three leading firms have consistently accounted for
96.5% of the market.140 In this context, minimizing tax exposure for small players
and new entrants may be essential for inducing greater competition. In contrast, in
markets which are closer to the 2500 HHI score of highly concentrated, more modest
tax relief may be appropriate. If ongoing or periodic review of oligopolistic markets
took place, the FTC or the DOJ would be in a position to make recommendations for
progressively higher tax relief based off of the degree of market concentration. This
approach would facilitate gradually reducing the degree of oligopoly tax relief as
markets reached lower levels of concentration. Congress frequently grants broad
discretion to agencies in interpreting and applying statutes, and granting the ability
of the FTC or DOJ to make annual recommendations on tax relief based on their
periodic determinations of market concentrations would be consistent with the
broader approach to agency discretion.
4. The Potential and Limits of Divestments
As discussed earlier, one of the main problems with the current process for
overseeing oligopolies is that it is a one-off process centering on review of
prospective mergers. Organic growth of oligopolies, however anticompetitive its
effects, generally escapes the eye of antitrust regulators who do not engage in

139. Steve Holland & Susan Heavey, White House Considers Tax Relief for Airlines,
Travel Firms Amid Coronavirus, REUTERS (Mar. 6, 2020, 10:08 AM), https://www.reuters
.com/article/idUSKBN20T226 [https://perma.cc/KLU9-848S].
140. See SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, Annual Report on Nationally
Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, December (Dec. 2018,), https://www.sec.gov
/files/2018-annual-report-on-nrsros.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z4B2-6T5U].
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periodic or rolling oversight of oligopolistic markets. That means in practice that
regulators generally fail even to consider using their ability to impose divestments to
promote greater competition outside of the merger context. For this reason,
regulators should potentially consider the desirability of periodic review of
oligopolistic markets to determine if divestments may be needed to reduce the degree
of market concentration in exceptionally concentrated markets.
The fundamental tension with the use of this policy tool is the concern that efforts
to deconcentrate oligopolistic markets may punish market participants who are
exceptional at what they do in winning and keeping customers. Simply put, it may
be difficult to distinguish exceptionally successful capitalism from leveraging market
power to suppress competition. The concern is that divestments are a heavy-handed,
invasive tactic that are more prone to mistake and arbitrary application, compared to
relying on disclosure rule changes, small business regulatory exemptions, or tax
incentives to level the playing field and foster competition. This fact makes this
policy tool the least appealing of the options this Article has addressed, but it is worth
considering the merits of this tactic as a last resort in exceptionally concentrated
markets if other efforts to mitigate oligopolistic dominance prove to be inadequate.
Understanding how regulators approach the questions of market concentration
and remedies of divestments in the merger context is useful for considering how to
recognize and potentially address market distortions by oligopolies. Since 1976, the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Department of Justice Antitrust Division
have systematically reviewed pending mergers of combined value of $200 million or
more for potential anticompetitive effects.141 The Hart-Scott-Rodino Act (“HSR”) of
1976 provides the basic framework for addressing market concentration issues in the
merger and acquisition context. The primary principles behind the HSR are to limit
the immediate anticompetitive effects of a merger and to sustain market competition
in the long run.142 The trigger for HSR merger review is modest—a net combined
market value of $200 million for the potentially combined companies.143 This trigger
does not account for the size of the relevant market (as a merger of firms worth $200
million could be large in a small market). But the (relatively) small size does
underscore the fact that the question of market concentration is incremental in nature
as even the consolidation of small players could have anticompetitive effects in a
concentrated market.

141. See Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90
Stat. 1383 (1976); see also Federal Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Announces Annual
Update of Size of Transaction Thresholds for Premerger Notification Filings and Interlocking
Directorates (Feb. 15, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2019/02/ftcannounces-annual-update-size-transaction-thresholds-premerger
[https://perma.cc/TU2GKNLG] (announcing that parties engaging in prospective mergers with a size-of-transaction
threshold of $200 million or more must disclose the proposed transaction to the FTC for
antitrust review).
142. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, A STUDY OF THE COMMISSION'S DIVESTITURE PROCESS, at 1
(1999),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/study-commissionsdivestiture-process/divestiture_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/E2FB-MTL7].
143. 15 U.S.C. § 18(a), (d)(1) (imposing the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act merger review
requirement on all companies whose combined value would be over $200 million except for
certain categories of exempted companies).
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Parties seeking to merge or acquire other companies must comply with notice and
waiting period requirements that equip the FTC and DOJ with time to review the
merger, leverage to negotiate with the parties about ways to mitigate the impact of
the merger or acquisition, and the opportunity to take preemptive steps to address the
potential anticompetitive effects.144 The antitrust regulators generally emphasize
mandating premerger divestments to ensure that either the FTC or DOJ is in the best
position to oversee compliance and to assess any resulting problems that may arise.145
The threat of the reviewing agency blocking the merger gives the agency leverage
to demand divestitures as a condition for the merger to proceed. In practice, the
overwhelming majority of consummated mergers are resolved through a negotiating
process between the agencies and the parties, and only a small minority of cases end
up being resolved through litigation.146 The key feature of these negotiations and
settlements is their ad hoc nature as there is not a clear blueprint for the contours of
settlements.147 The underlying objective of the agencies is to design remedial
measures that maintain or restore the degree of competition that existed in the
industry prior to the merger by using divestments to create a viable competitor that
can offset the impact of the merger. The agencies typically allow the parties to
restructure the proposed merger to mitigate anticompetitive effects, to require upfront buyers before agreement on a consent order, and to use “crown jewel
provisions”148 to require divestments of assets greater than the de minimis needed to
restore competition in order to ensure that prospective buyers emerge in a timely way

144. Id. § 18a(b)(1) (laying out the thirty-day waiting period, which is frequently
extended); H.R. REP. NO. 94-1373, at 8 (1976) (explaining how the notice and waiting period
under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act provides regulators with the time to identify issues and to
develop a case for a preliminary injunction against a merger).
145. The merging parties file with both the FTC and the DOJ, and the agencies agree
among themselves which agency will review the merger to avoid redundancy in oversight.
The fact that each agency unilaterally conducts antitrust merger review in any given case may
lead to differences on the margins in their exercise of discretion, but their powers and approach
share common features. Both the FTC and DOJ enjoy broad powers to demand modifications
of mergers to address concerns about anticompetitive effects, and either agency can seek
injunctions to bar mergers from taking place if the anticompetitive concerns cannot be
addressed. 15 U.S.C. § 53(b); Guidelines, supra note 17, § 1.
146. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 142, at 6–7 (noting that less than ten percent of
agency merger reviews result in litigation as the overwhelming majority are resolved through
negotiated settlements).
147. See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 330–31
(1961) (“Divestiture has been called the most important of antitrust remedies. It is simple,
relatively easy to administer, and sure. It should always be in the forefront of a court's mind
when a violation of § 7 has been found.”); U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., Antitrust Division Policy Guide
to Merger Remedies at 7 (2004) (“Structural remedies are preferred to conduct remedies in
merger cases because they are relatively clean and certain, and generally avoid costly
government entanglement in the market.”).
148. See William J. Baer & Ronald C. Redcay, Solving Competition Problems in Merger
Control: The Requirements for an Effective Divestment Remedy, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 915,
915–16 (2001).
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and can function as viable competitors.149 The agencies and parties can enter into a
binding judgment or consent decree to remedy the anticompetitive effects of
proposed mergers,150 which are subject to judicial review that is limited to the narrow
determination of whether the proposed divestitures are in the public interest.151 The
FTC and the DOJ rely almost exclusively on ex ante divestment remedies rather than
conduct-based remedies because conduct-based remedies would require periodic
regulatory oversight and greater scrutiny.152
In the merger review context, the FTC and DOJ generally presume that mergers
in a highly concentrated market (with a 2500 HHI score or higher) that increase
leading participants’ market share by four percent is anticompetitive and requires
divestments. Similarly, regulators generally enjoin or craft a divestment remedy for
increases in market share of 1% or more if a merging party already controls 35% or
more of the market.153 The underlying rationale for the reliance on divestments to
offset increases in market concentration is that regulators should generally give
parties limited leeway in pursuing mergers in highly concentrated markets.
In theory regulators could apply a similar approach to divestments as part of a
periodic review of oligopolistic markets. The same increases in market share that
trigger merger review scrutiny can occur through organic growth or the exit of a
smaller competitor. If the anticompetitive effects of organic growth or competitor
exit are the same, then it begs the questions of what is different or whether the effects
of organic growth or competitor exit should be treated differently by regulators if
divestments are the remedy of choice in the merger review context. Part of the answer
lies in the leverage that antitrust regulators have over mergers. Mergers not only get
the attention of regulators, but regulators enjoy broad discretion to block mergers
from taking place or to require divestments. The failure of a competitor may grab
headlines (and therefore should arouse regulators’ attention), but traditionally this
event has not been a catalyst for antitrust review of oligopolistic industries since it
results in growth in market share by subtraction. Similarly, antitrust regulators have
generally cast a blind eye to the growth in market share of oligopolists occurring
through unilateral expansion and attributed that to market success.

149. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., Antitrust Division Policy Guide to Merger Remedies at 3
(2011) (discussing efforts to have convergent practices on divestments for DOJ and the FTC).
150. See Guide to the Antitrust Laws: The Enforcers, FED. TRADE COMM’N,
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/antitrust/enforcers.shtm [https://perma.cc/ZLW2-5YB9].
151. See 15 U.S.C. § 16(b)–(h) (requiring the Department of Justice to file consent decrees
with a federal district court, as well as a competitive impact statement that details the agreed
upon remedy). But see Farrell Malone & J. Gregory Sidak, Should Antitrust Consent Decrees
Regulate Post-Merger Pricing?, J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 471, 475–76 (2007) (noting that
the Federal Trade Commission’s consent decrees are not subject to judicial review because the
FTC serves in the role of a trial court).
152. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., Antitrust Division Policy Guide to Merger Remedies
at 7–8 (2004) (explaining how the DOJ generally favors divestments over conduct-based
remedies because divestments are designed to address anti-competitive effects up front with
less government intervention and to avoid the need for periodic government monitoring).
153. See id. at § 3.12 (1984), https://www.justice.gov/archives/atr/1984-merger-guidelines
[https://perma.cc/9SRP-7WH2].
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The challenge in applying a divestment approach to remedy the entrenchment of
oligopolies is that there is no clear framework for how to address the issue of organic
growth, both in terms of the trigger and the scope of the remedy.154 The existing
premise for merger review is the goal of using divestments to maintain or restore the
degree of competition that existed in the industry prior to the merger. If the exit of a
smaller competitor or organic growth by industry leaders triggered regulatory review
of market concentration and mandatory divestments, then there is the legitimate
concern that regulators would be imposing a draconian sanction on firms who have
achieved greater efficiencies than their competitors due to innovation, better
strategies, or better economies of scale.155 The related concern is what the end goal
should be. For example, if a competitor fails and the reduced supply of product
increases the leading players’ market share, would it be sensible to have the objective
be to have divestments restore the earlier status quo of the leading players’ market
share?
The worry is that a broad reliance on divestments may lead to excessive and
potentially arbitrary intervention to keep market shares at government-set levels.
That was the underlying concern with the 1969 “Neal Report” that proposed the
creation of a “Concentrated Industries Act,” which called for affirmative efforts by
the Department of Justice to identify oligopolistic markets and to “reduce
concentration so that the market share of each oligopoly firm would not exceed 12
percent.”156 While this approach was a well-intended effort to foster competition, it
failed because of objections that it would lead to excessive government intervention
in the economy through mandatory divestments and undermine competition by
disincentivizing companies from growing beyond 12% market shares.157
These concerns suggest the appeal of relying on less invasive tactics to level the
playing field between dominant firms and their smaller competitors, such as the use
of disclosure and regulatory exemptions and tax incentives, which this article has
discussed. Regulators should only consider using divestments as a last resort in
exceptionally concentrated markets if these other remedies are not sufficient to
change the landscape of competition but should not be using divestments as a routine
tool for overseeing oligopolistic markets. For example, regulators could rely on the
2500 HHI score as a proxy for an oligopolistic market, and only begin considering

154. See, e.g., Id. at § 1 (discussing how “merger analysis does not consist of uniform
application of a single methodology” but rather is a “fact-specific process through which the
[a]gencies . . . apply a range of analytical tools . . . to evaluate competitive concerns”).
155. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp & Carl Shapiro, Horizontal Mergers, Market Structure,
and Burdens of Proof, 127 YALE L.J. 1996, 2006–07 (2018) (noting that “modern industrial
organization economics strongly supports the view that antitrust policy must always be careful
not to discourage firms, even large firms, from competing on the merits to attract more
customers”); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962) (positing that “the
objective of anti-trust law is ‘the protection of competition, not competitors’” (emphasis
added)); accord Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 906
(2007) (quoting Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 338 (1990)).
156. Phil C. Neal et. al, Report of the White House Task Force on Antitrust Policy, 115
CONG. REC. S15933, S16036 (daily ed. June 16, 1969).
157. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Introduction to the Neal Report and the Crisis in Antitrust,
5 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 217, 220–22 (2009).
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the extraordinary intervention of divestments (in the nonmerger context) if the
market concentration is at 3500 HHI or higher. The logic is that at a high enough
threshold of market concentration policymakers should consider whether
divestments are needed to prevent the dominant players that are leveraging their
economies of scale to crowd out small participants and new entrants from the market.
Under these circumstances concerns of “punishing” companies for their market
success may appear less tenable because their dominance makes it virtually
impossible for competition to emerge, especially if regulators have already exhausted
the use of other alternative tools to heighten competition.
To put this point in context, a 3500 HHI score is the equivalent of a market with
two dominant firms with 42% market shares. Absent an innovation that entails
creative disruption of the market, both smaller firms and new entrants may have great
difficulty creating both the economies of scale and reputation to compete with the
dominant players. Even in this context, the challenge would be to determine what the
baseline should be for restoring competition as regulators would face somewhat
arbitrary decisions about how far divestments must go to restore opportunities for
competition. Given the blunt nature of the divestment approach, it should only be
considered in extraordinary cases where the market concentration is exceptionally
high, and other efforts at fostering competition have proven to be ineffective. For this
reason, this Article argues that the focus of periodic review of oligopolies should be
on crafting regulatory exemptions and tax incentives to level the playing field for
smaller competitors to compete with oligopolists.
5. Applying Market Deconcentration Tools in the Filtering Intermediary Context
Instituting periodic review of oligopolistic markets and equipping regulators with
tools to foster competition would be positive steps towards addressing the problems
posed by oligopolies. But this approach’s efficacy would turn on the case-by-case
application of these tools, and filtering oligopolies offers attractive case studies for
thinking about where these measures may be the most useful. The rating agency
context offers the starkest example of where the full tool kit of regulators may be
needed. The top three rating agencies have consistently accounted for 96.5% of the
market. In 2018 S&P had a 49.2% market share, Moody’s had a 33.1% market share,
and Fitch had a 13.5% market share.158 This case illustrates one of the most
exceptionally concentrated markets with an HHI score of over 3700. Since the DoddFrank Act of 2010, the Office of Credit Rating Agencies has demanded increasing
amounts of disclosures from nationally recognized statistical rating agencies
regardless of whether the rating agencies are publicly or privately held. But to date

158. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT 2018, supra note 4 (documenting that three
rating agencies dominate the market: S&P–49.2% market share; Moody’s–33.1% market
share; Fitch–13.5% market share; DBRS 2.3% market share; Other–1.9% market share); see
also SEC & EXCH. COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT ON NATIONALLY RECOGNIZED STATISTICAL
RATING ORGANIZATIONS 11 (2016), https://www.sec.gov/ocr/reportspubs/annual-reports/2016
-annual-report-on-nrsros.pdf [https://perma.cc/S7SU-YG4Z] (documenting that the top three
rating agencies account for 96.5% of the market, a higher percentage than before the DoddFrank Act was enacted which initiated greater regulation and oversight of the rating agency
market).
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these disclosure burdens have disproportionately fallen on the smaller rating
agencies. Regulations have made it more expensive and more difficult to compete
with the dominant players by adding layers of internal controls and safeguards
against conflicts of interest.159
Antitrust regulators should consider coordinating with the SEC to increase the
extent of disclosures facing the dominant oligopolists. Their goal should be to secure
more detailed disclosures concerning the quantitative and qualitative dimensions of
rating agency methodologies, so that their ratings can be readily reproducible and
confirmable. This approach would make it more difficult for business concerns to
shape the substance of the rating process, would make it easier for comparisons of
ratings to assess their accuracy, and would make it easier for smaller rating agencies
to compete by giving them a clearer picture of the opaque processes that larger rating
agencies employ. Similarly, antitrust regulators should work with the SEC to
consider broadly employing small business exemptions to reduce the regulatory
burdens of smaller competitors. For example, the SEC’s rule prohibiting rating
agencies from having a single client account for more than 10% of revenue is a wellintended safeguard against conflicts of interest.160 But in practice, this measure
makes it much more difficult for smaller rating agencies or new entrants to compete
because of their limited client base, while the dominant rating agencies can easily
meet this requirement. Small business exemptions should allow smaller rating
agencies to meet the burdens of demonstrating their independence and absence of
conflicts of interests in simpler, less costly ways that recognize the substantial
barriers to effective competition.
Similarly, antitrust regulators should consider the potential for tax incentives to
attract new entrants to the ratings industry or an oligopoly tax on the extraordinary
returns that ratings firms enjoy. Of the leading three rating firms, only Moody’s is a
free-standing, publicly traded company. In the almost ten-year period from the
collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 through January 2017, Moody’s
shares increased at more than double the rate of increase of the S&P 500 index (180%
to 81%). In the aftermath of the Dodd-Frank Act through January 2017, Moody’s
stock increased at triple the rate of the S&P 500 Index (355% to 112%). Moody’s
operating margins are 42%, higher than virtually any sector of the U.S. economy.161
Standard & Poor’s rating agency business accounts for about 50% of the firm’s
revenues, but it is more difficult to parse out the profitability of this segment of the
business. However, S&P has disclosed to the SEC that each analyst brings in over
one million dollars in revenue a year, which is a comparable figure to Moody’s
regulatory disclosures and suggests similar levels of profitability.162 Fitch is privately
held, which makes the financial comparison more difficult. The logic of applying an
oligopoly tax to the dominant firms is that their high levels of profitability reflect the

159. See Jeffrey Manns, Downgrading Rating Agency Reform, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 749,
776–78 (2013).
160. 17 C.F.R § 240.17g-5(c)(1) (2019).
161. Frank Partnoy, What’s Still Wrong with Rating Agencies, 92 WASH. L. REV. 1407,
1426–27 (2017).
162. See Bloomberg News, S&P, Moody’s Boosting Rating Fees Faster Than
Inflation, FIN. POST (Nov. 15, 2011), http://business.financialpost.com/news/economy/spmoodys-boosting-rating-fees-faster-than-inflation [https://perma.cc/N9WD-J7LV].
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large economies of scale and reputational barriers that entrench their dominance and
allow them to charge prices that reflect this market power. The scope of a potential
oligopoly tax would be a fact-intensive question which regulators could consider and
potentially expand depending on the impact of the tax in fostering competition. The
mirror image of this approach would be applying similar analysis to design tax
incentives for smaller competitors to offset the substantial economic damages that
the dominant ratings oligopolists enjoy.
The high degree of market concentration in the ratings agency context may make
it one of the most appealing contexts for considering the potential of divestments.
Because the rating agency industry consists of numerous submarkets of government
and private debt ratings, it is conceivable for regulators to consider mandating
spinoffs or sales of parts of the leading firms’ business to create ready-made
competitors. The important caveat is that this approach should be a last resort, and
that regulators should focus on the disclosure, regulatory, and tax strategies to level
the playing field for smaller competitors, strategies that have never been tried in the
oligopoly context.
Another context that illustrates the potential of preemptive oligopoly regulation
is the social media market. Antitrust regulators could analyze the market in terms of
the numerous sub-markets that exist, but for the sake of this discussion, I will focus
on the overall social media market share based on site visits (which serves as a proxy
for potential advertising and consumer information-based revenue streams). In May
2020, Facebook had 55.9% of site visits, Pinterest had 29.86% of site visits, Twitter
had 9.01% of site visits, Instagram had 1.41% of site visits, YouTube had 1.82% of
site visits, and the other players had less than 1% of site visits.163 This market share
distribution amounts to an HHI score of 4,097.60, a highly concentrated market that
borders on the exceptional levels of concentration of the rating agency industry. The
HHI further extends to above 4200, a level that the rating agency industry does not
even touch, if Instagram and Facebook’s shares are combined following Facebooks
acquisition of the app in 2012.164
The challenge of regulating the social media market is that these firms vary
tremendously in terms of profitability, and there is a striking absence of current
regulation. For example, Facebook had a net income of $22 billion in 2019,165 while
Pinterest has never made any profits as it has focused exclusively on using investor
dollars to build market share with the long-term promise of profitability.166 For this
reason, it would make much less sense to focus on the potential for an oligopoly tax

163. See J. Clement, U.S. Market Share of Leading Social Media in May 2020, STATISTA,
(Jun. 18, 2020), https://www.statista.com/statistics/265773/market-share-of-the-most-popular
-social-media-websites-in-the-us/ [https://perma.cc/NE8X-RB4F].
164. See Sam Shead, Facebook Owns the Four Most Downloaded Apps of the Decade,
BBC (Dec. 18, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-50838013 [https://perma.cc
/FQP3-X9J6].
165. J. Clement, Facebook’s Net Income from 1st Quarter 2010 to 2nd Quarter 2020,
STATISTA (Feb. 24, 2020), https://www.statista.com/statistics/223289/facebooks-quarterly-net
-income/ [https://perma.cc/ZFV3-MUHY].
166. See Ari Levy, Pinterest Stock Tanks 21% on Revenue Miss and Disappointing
Forecast, CNBC (Oct. 31, 2019, 4:07 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/31/pinterest-pinsstock-falls-after-third-quarter-sales-miss.html [https://perma.cc/VG7J-94NW].
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or tax incentives to foster greater competition in the social media market. Instead,
the question of oligopoly regulation is tied into the broader landscape of what the
regulation of social media should look like. As policymakers grapple with the
question of what disclosures and regulations are appropriate for social media
companies, they should recognize the potential market power of the dominant players
and seek to ensure that smaller competitors face a lighter disclosure and regulatory
burden to give them the chance to compete with entrenched incumbents. While the
level of market concentration is high, the segmentation of the social media market
that Facebook, Pinterest, Twitter, and Instagram cover suggests that regulators
should be cautious in considering this invasive tool and should focus on the potential
for using disclosure or regulatory tools to favor smaller competitors and new
entrants.
At the same time, regulators should be cautious about whether additional
measures are necessary to address high levels of market concentration. The U.S.
digital advertising market offers an example of where there is market concentration,
but not arising to a level where government intervention would be productive. As of
2019, Google had a 37.2% market share of digital advertising revenues, Facebook
had a 22.1% market share, Amazon had an 8.8% market share, Microsoft had a 3.8%
market share, and Verizon had a 2.9% market share.167 These market concentration
figures amount to an HHI score of 1,972.54, or roughly the midway point for the
antitrust regulators’ assessment of a moderately concentrated market. While the high
market shares of Google and Facebook are matters of concern, the nature of the
strong competitors that they face—Amazon, Microsoft, and Verizon—suggests that
there is the potential for greater fluidity of market share over time. Amazon,
Microsoft, and Verizon would not be referred to as smaller competitors in their
primary markets of competition, but that fact suggests that they possess significant
resources to bring to bear to build market share, even with sustained losses, in the
digital advertising space. For this reason, while the digital advertising market should
be on the radar of antitrust regulators, there is not a strong case for applying an
expanded tool kit of measures to promote greater competition in this market.
The U.S. e-commerce market poses a more daunting challenge for whether to
apply measures to mitigate market concentration. As of the fourth quarter of 2019,
Amazon has by far the largest market of e-commerce at 46.7% of online revenue,
followed by Walmart with 11.71%, Apple with 7.94%, Home Depot with 6.57%,
Best Buy with 6.524%, Target with 4.17%, Macy’s with 4.13%, Wayfair with 3.8%,
and Costco with 3.33%.168 These numbers place the e-commerce market just on the
threshold of a highly concentrated market with an HHI score of 2509. In theory under
this Article’s approach, antitrust regulators could begin to employ disclosure,

167. See Felix Richter, Amazon Challenges Ad Duopoly, STATISTA, (Feb. 21, 2019),
https://www.statista.com/chart/17109/us-digital-advertising-market-share/ [https://perma.cc
/MQ2R-44T7]; EMarketer Editors, US Digital Ad Spending Will Surpass Traditional in 2019,
(Feb. 19, 2019), https://www.emarketer.com/content/us-digital-ad-spending-will-surpasstraditional-in-2019 [https://perma.cc/6NBC-4JB8].
168. See United States: Top 10 Online 2018, by Revenue, STATISTA (Apr. 30, 2020),
https://www.statista.com/forecasts/646030/united-states-top-online-stores-united-statesecommercedb/ [https://perma.cc/HP99-FYXU].
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regulatory, or tax incentive tools to attempt to lower the playing field between the
two leading players of the market, Amazon and Walmart, with the smaller
competitors. But in practice even under this article’s approach, regulators would be
wiser to monitor the e-commerce market periodically to assess the landscape of
market share rather than to engage in intervention. If the level of market
concentration continues to increase, then regulators would have the toolkit available
to begin to try to level the playing field for smaller competitors. But given the sizable,
single digit market shares of a number of leading brick and mortar players, there is a
strong case to be made for waiting and seeing how the e-commerce market share
landscape unfolds before engaging in any type of government intervention.
However, examining this issue through the lens of the gross value of sales in the
U.S. e-commerce market may give further insight that would suggest the need to
consider preemptive regulation of this market. The difference between the data on
revenue and sales by gross value is that sales by gross value account for the platform
usage by third parties. In looking at the measuring stick of sales by gross value,
Amazon’s market share drops down to 38.7% from 46.7%, however the other
competitors suffer more significant drops in market share. Walmart’s market share
drops by half from 11.7% to 5.3% and third-place Apple drops from 7.9% to 3.7%.169
This leaves Amazon as the only market participant with a market share in the double
digits. This revenue statistic shows that other competitors are still making a fair
amount of revenue. But in terms of market control, which can be seen by the gross
value of goods sold, it appears Amazon has a firmer grip on the industry than the
revenue numbers may have suggested. This metric bolsters the case for instituting
periodic review of the e-commerce market and the desirability of considering the use
of tools to spur competition if Amazon continues to expand its domination of the
gross value of sales.
CONCLUSION
This Article has made the case for oligopolies to be subjected to greater regulatory
scrutiny and potentially proactive regulation. Antitrust regulators should sustain
preemptive periodic oversight of highly concentrated markets (rather than react
primarily in response to merger reviews), impose heightened disclosures on
oligopolists to facilitate monitoring both by public and private, and seek to open up
these markets to greater competition by lowering the regulatory, disclosure, and tax
barriers to entry for small-market participants. There may be scope for use of
divestments in extraordinary circumstances in which these other policy tools fail to
open up greater competition. But the practical shortcomings of divestment strategies
suggest that antitrust regulators should instead periodically monitor oligopolistic
markets and find ways to level the playing field for smaller players and new entrants
to increase competition.

169. See Target Cracks Top 10 US Ecommerce Ranking, EMARKETER (Feb. 28, 2020),
https://www.emarketer.com/content/target-cracks-top-10-us-ecommerce-ranking
[https://perma.cc/Y7EU-ANLX].

